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Plato's Republic Book VI, translated by Paul Shorey

text adapted from the Perseus Digital Library

Published onAug 30, 2024
Plato's Republic Book VI, translated by Paul Shorey

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[484a]

Socrates

“So now, Glaucon,” I said, “our argument after winding a long and weary way has at last made clear to us who are the philosophers or lovers of wisdom and who are not.” “Yes,” he said, “a shorter way is perhaps not feasible.” “Apparently not,” I said. “I, at any rate, think that the matter would have been made still plainer if we had had nothing but this to speak of, and if there were not so many things left which our purpose of discerning the difference between the just and [484b] the unjust life requires us to discuss.” “What, then,” he said, “comes next?” “What else,” said I, “but the next in order? Since the philosophers are those who are capable of apprehending that which is eternal and unchanging, while those who are incapable of this but lose themselves and wander amid the multiplicities of multifarious things, are not philosophers, which of the two kinds ought to be the leaders in a state?” “What, then,” he said, “would be a fair statement of the matter?” “Whichever,” I said, “appear competent to guard the laws and pursuits of society, [484c] these we should establish as guardians.” “Right” he said. “Is this, then,” said I, “clear, whether the guardian who is to keep watch over anything ought to be blind or keen of sight?” “Of course it is clear,” he said. “Do you think, then, that there is any appreciable difference between the blind and those who are veritably deprived of the knowledge of the veritable being of things, those who have no vivid pattern in their souls and so cannot, as painters look to their models, fix their eyes on the absolute truth, and always with reference to that ideal and in the exactest possible contemplation of it [484d] establish in this world also the laws of the beautiful, the just and the good, when that is needful, or guard and preserve those that are established?” “No, by heaven,” he said, “there is not much difference.” “Shall we, then, appoint these blind souls as our guardians, rather than those who have learned to know the ideal reality of things and who do not fall short of the others in experience and are not second to them in any part of virtue?” “It would be strange indeed,” he said, “to choose others than the philosophers, provided they were not deficient in those other respects, for this very knowledge [485a] of the ideal would perhaps be the greatest of superiorities.” “Then what we have to say is how it would be possible for the same persons to have both qualifications, is it not?” “ Quite so.” “Then, as we were saying at the beginning of this discussion, the first thing to understand is the nature that they must have from birth; and I think that if we sufficiently agree on this we shall also agree that the combination of qualities that we seek belongs to the same persons, and that we need no others for guardians of states than these.” “How so?”

“We must accept as agreed this trait of the philosophical nature, [485b] that it is ever enamored of the kind of knowledge which reveals to them something of that essence which is eternal, and is not wandering between the two poles of generation and decay.” “Let us take that as agreed.” “And, further,” said I, “that their desire is for the whole of it and that they do not willingly renounce a small or a great, a more precious or a less honored, part of it. That was the point of our former illustration drawn from lovers and men covetous of honor.” “You are right,” he said. “Consider, then, next whether the men who are to meet our requirements [485c] must not have this further quality in their natures.” “What quality?” “The spirit of truthfulness, reluctance to admit falsehood in any form, the hatred of it and the love of truth.” “It is likely,” he said. “It is not only likely, my friend, but there is every necessity that he who is by nature enamored of anything should cherish all that is akin and pertaining to the object of his love.” “Right,” he said. “Could you find anything more akin to wisdom than truth?” “Impossible,” he said. “Then can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and of falsehood?” [485d] “By no means.” “Then the true lover of knowledge must, from childhood up, be most of all a striver after truth in every form.” “By all means.” “But, again, we surely are aware that when in a man the desires incline strongly to any one thing, they are weakened for other things. It is as if the stream had been diverted into another channel. “Surely.” “So, when a man's desires have been taught to flow in the channel of learning and all that sort of thing, they will be concerned, I presume, with the pleasures of the soul in itself, and will be indifferent to those of which the body is the instrument, if the man is a true and not a sham philosopher.” [485e] “That is quite necessary.” “Such a man will be temperate and by no means greedy for wealth; for the things for the sake of which money and great expenditure are eagerly sought others may take seriously, but not he.” “It is so.” “And there is this further point to be considered in distinguishing [486a] the philosophical from the unphilosophical nature.” “What point?” “You must not overlook any touch of illiberality. For nothing can be more contrary than such pettiness to the quality of a soul that is ever to seek integrity and wholeness in all things human and divine.” “Most true,” he said. “Do you think that a mind habituated to thoughts of grandeur and the contemplation of all time and all existence can deem this life of man a thing of great concern?” “Impossible,” said he. [486b] “Hence such a man will not suppose death to be terrible?” “Least of all.” “Then a cowardly and illiberal spirit, it seems, could have no part in genuine philosophy.” “I think not.” “What then? Could a man of orderly spirit, not a lover of money, not illiberal, nor a braggart nor a coward, ever prove unjust, or a driver of hard bargains?” “Impossible.” “This too, then, is a point that in your discrimination of the philosophic and unphilosophic soul you will observe—whether the man is from youth up just and gentle or unsocial and savage.” “Assuredly.” “Nor will you overlook this, [486c] I fancy.” “What?” “Whether he is quick or slow to learn. Or do you suppose that anyone could properly love a task which he performed painfully and with little result from much toil?” “That could not be.” “And if he could not keep what he learned, being steeped in oblivion, could he fail to be void of knowledge?” “How could he?” “And so, having all his labor for naught, will he not finally be constrained to loathe himself and that occupation?” [486d] “Of course.” “The forgetful soul, then, we must not list in the roll of competent lovers of wisdom, but we require a good memory.” “By all means.” “But assuredly we should not say that the want of harmony and seemliness in a nature conduces to anything else than the want of measure and proportion.” “Certainly.” “And do you think that truth is akin to measure and proportion or to disproportion?” “To proportion.” “Then in addition to our other requirements we look for a mind endowed with measure and grace, whose native disposition will make it easily guided [486e] to the aspect of the ideal reality in all things.” “Assuredly.” “Tell me, then, is there any flaw in the argument? Have we not proved the qualities enumerated to be necessary and compatible with one another for the soul that is to have a sufficient and perfect apprehension of reality?”

[487a] “Nay, most necessary,” he said. “Is there any fault, then, that you can find with a pursuit which a man could not properly practise unless he were by nature of good memory, quick apprehension, magnificent, gracious, friendly and akin to truth, justice, bravery and sobriety?” “Momus himself,” he said, “could not find fault with such a combination.” “Well, then,” said I, “when men of this sort are perfected by education and maturity of age, would you not entrust the state solely to them?”

And Adeimantus said, “No one, Socrates, [487b] would be able to controvert these statements of yours. But, all the same, those who occasionally hear you argue thus feel in this way: They think that owing to their inexperience in the game of question and answer they are at every question led astray a little bit by the argument, and when these bits are accumulated at the conclusion of the discussion mighty is their fall and the apparent contradiction of what they at first said; and that just as by expert draught-players the unskilled are finally shut in and cannot make a move, [487c] so they are finally blocked and have their mouths stopped by this other game of draughts played not with counters but with words; yet the truth is not affected by that outcome. I say this with reference to the present case, for in this instance one might say that he is unable in words to contend against you at each question, but that when it comes to facts he sees that of those who turn to philosophy, not merely touching upon it to complete their education [487d] and dropping it while still young, but lingering too long in the study of it, the majority become cranks, not to say rascals, and those accounted the finest spirits among them are still rendered useless to society by the pursuit which you commend.” And I, on hearing this, said, “Do you think that they are mistaken in saying so?” “I don't know,” said he, [487e] “but I would gladly hear your opinion.” “You may hear, then, that I think that what they say is true.” “How, then,” he replied, “can it be right to say that our cities will never be freed from their evils until the philosophers, whom we admit to be useless to them, become their rulers?” “Your question,” I said, “requires an answer expressed in a comparison or parable.” “And you,” he said, “of course, are not accustomed to speak in comparisons!”

“So,” said I, “you are making fun of me after driving me into such an impasse of argument. But, all the same, hear my comparison [488a] so that you may still better see how I strain after imagery. For so cruel is the condition of the better sort in relation to the state that there is no single thing like it in nature. But to find a likeness for it and a defence for them one must bring together many things in such a combination as painters mix when they portray goat-stags and similar creatures. Conceive this sort of thing happening either on many ships or on one: Picture a shipmaster in height and strength surpassing all others on the ship, [488b] but who is slightly deaf and of similarly impaired vision, and whose knowledge of navigation is on a par with his sight and hearing. Conceive the sailors to be wrangling with one another for control of the helm, each claiming that it is his right to steer though he has never learned the art and cannot point out his teacher or any time when he studied it. And what is more, they affirm that it cannot be taught at all, but they are ready to make mincemeat of anyone who says that it can be taught, [488c] and meanwhile they are always clustered about the shipmaster importuning him and sticking at nothing to induce him to turn over the helm to them. And sometimes, if they fail and others get his ear, they put the others to death or cast them out from the ship, and then, after binding and stupefying the worthy shipmaster with mandragora or intoxication or otherwise, they take command of the ship, consume its stores and, drinking and feasting, make such a voyage of it as is to be expected from such, and as if that were not enough, they praise and celebrate as a navigator, [488d] a pilot, a master of shipcraft, the man who is most cunning to lend a hand in persuading or constraining the shipmaster to let them rule, while the man who lacks this craft they censure as useless. They have no suspicions that the true pilot must give his attention to the time of the year, the seasons, the sky, the winds, the stars, and all that pertains to his art if he is to be a true ruler of a ship, and that he does not believe that there is any art or science of seizing the helm [488e] with or without the consent of others, or any possibility of mastering this alleged art and the practice of it at the same time with the science of navigation. With such goings-on aboard ship do you not think that the real pilot would in very deed be called a star-gazer, an idle babbler, [489a] a useless fellow, by the sailors in ships managed after this fashion?” “Quite so,” said Adeimantus. “You take my meaning, I presume, and do not require us to put the comparison to the proof and show that the condition we have described is the exact counterpart of the relation of the state to the true philosophers.” “It is indeed,” he said. “To begin with, then, teach this parable to the man who is surprised that philosophers are not honored in our cities, and try to convince him that it would be far more surprising [489b] if they were honored.” “I will teach him,” he said. “And say to him further: You are right in affirming that the finest spirit among the philosophers are of no service to the multitude. But bid him blame for this uselessness, not the finer spirits, but those who do not know how to make use of them. For it is not the natural course of things that the pilot should beg the sailors to be ruled by him or that wise men should go to the doors of the rich. The author of that epigram was a liar. But the true nature of things is that whether the sick man be rich or poor he must needs go to the door of the physician, [489c] and everyone who needs to be governed to the door of the man who knows how to govern, not that the ruler should implore his natural subjects to let themselves be ruled, if he is really good for anything. But you will make no mistake in likening our present political rulers to the sort of sailors we are just describing, and those whom these call useless and star-gazing ideologists to the true pilots.” “Just so,” he said. “Hence, and under these conditions, we cannot expect that the noblest pursuit should be highly esteemed by those whose way of life is quite the contrary. [489d] But far the greatest and chief disparagement of philosophy is brought upon it by the pretenders to that way of life, those whom you had in mind when you affirmed that the accuser of philosophy says that the majority of her followers are rascals and the better sort useless, while I admitted that what you said was true. Is not that so?” “Yes.”

“Have we not, then, explained the cause of the uselessness of the better sort?” “We have.” “Shall we next set forth the inevitableness of the degeneracy of the majority, and try to show if we can that philosophy [489e] is not to be blamed for this either?” “By all means.” “Let us begin, then, what we have to say and hear by recalling the starting-point of our description of the nature which he who is to be [490a] a scholar and gentleman must have from birth. The leader of the choir for him, if you recollect, was truth. That he was to seek always and altogether, on pain of being an impostor without part or lot in true philosophy.” “Yes, that was said.” “Is not this one point quite contrary to the prevailing opinion about him?” “It is indeed,” he said. “Will it not be a fair plea in his defence to say that it was the nature of the real lover of knowledge to strive emulously for true being and that he would not linger over [490b] the many particulars that are opined to be real, but would hold on his way, and the edge of his passion would not be blunted nor would his desire fail till he came into touch with the nature of each thing in itself by that part of his soul to which it belongs to lay hold on that kind of reality—the part akin to it, namely—and through that approaching it, and consorting with reality really, he would beget intelligence and truth, attain to knowledge and truly live and grow, and so find surcease from his travail of soul, but not before?” “No plea could be fairer.” “Well, then, will such a man love falsehood, [490c] or, quite the contrary, hate it?” “Hate it,” he said. “When truth led the way, no choir of evils, we, I fancy, would say, could ever follow in its train.” “How could it?” “But rather a sound and just character, which is accompanied by temperance.” “Right,” he said. “What need, then, of repeating from the beginning our proof of the necessary order of the choir that attends on the philosophical nature? You surely remember that we found pertaining to such a nature courage, grandeur of soul, aptness to learn, memory. And when you interposed [490d] the objection that though everybody will be compelled to admit our statements, yet, if we abandoned mere words and fixed our eyes on the persons to whom the words referred, everyone would say that he actually saw some of them to be useless and most of them base with all baseness, it was in our search for the cause of this ill-repute that we came to the present question: Why is it that the majority are bad? And, for the sake of this, we took up again the nature of the true philosophers and defined what it must necessarily be?” [490e] “That is so,” he said.

“We have, then,” I said, “to contemplate the causes of the corruption of this nature in the majority, while a small part escapes, even those whom men call not bad but useless; and after that in turn [491a] we are to observe those who imitate this nature and usurp its pursuits and see what types of souls they are that thus entering upon a way of life which is too high for them and exceeds their powers, by the many discords and disharmonies of their conduct everywhere and among all men bring upon philosophy the repute of which you speak.” “Of what corruptions are you speaking?” “I will try,” I said, “to explain them to you if I can. I think everyone will grant us this point, that a nature such as we just now postulated [491b] for the perfect philosopher is a rare growth among men and is found in only a few. Don't you think so?” “Most emphatically.” “Observe, then, the number and magnitude of the things that operate to destroy these few.” “What are they?” “The most surprising fact of all is that each of the gifts of nature which we praise tends to corrupt the soul of its possessor and divert it from philosophy. I am speaking of bravery, sobriety, and the entire list.” “That does sound like a paradox,” said he. [491c] “Furthermore,” said I, “all the so-called goods corrupt and divert, beauty and wealth and strength of body and powerful family connections in the city and all things akin to them—you get my general meaning?” “I do,” he said, “and I would gladly hear a more precise statement of it.” “Well,” said I, “grasp it rightly as a general proposition and the matter will be clear and the preceding statement will not seem to you so strange.” “How do you bid me proceed?” he said. [491d] “We know it to be universally true of every seed and growth, whether vegetable or animal, that the more vigorous it is the more it falls short of its proper perfection when deprived of the food, the season, the place that suits it. For evil is more opposed to the good than to the not-good. “Of course.” “So it is, I take it, natural that the best nature should fare worse than the inferior under conditions of nurture unsuited to it.” “It is.” “Then,” said I, “Adeimantus, [491e] shall we not similarly affirm that the best endowed souls become worse than the others under a bad education? Or do you suppose that great crimes and unmixed wickedness spring from a slight nature and not from a vigorous one corrupted by its nurture, while a weak nature will never be the cause of anything great, either for good or evil?” “No,” he said, “that is the case.”

[492a] “Then the nature which we assumed in the philosopher, if it receives the proper teaching, must needs grow and attain to consummate excellence, but, if it be sown and planted and grown in the wrong environment, the outcome will be quite the contrary unless some god comes to the rescue. Or are you too one of the multitude who believe that there are young men who are corrupted by the sophists, and that there are sophists in private life who corrupt to any extent worth mentioning, and that it is not rather the very men who talk in this strain [492b] who are the chief sophists and educate most effectively and mould to their own heart's desire young and old, men and women?” “When?” said he. “Why, when,” I said, “the multitude are seated together in assemblies or in court-rooms or theaters or camps or any other public gathering of a crowd, and with loud uproar censure some of the things that are said and done and approve others, both in excess, with full-throated clamor [492c] and clapping of hands, and thereto the rocks and the region round about re-echoing redouble the din of the censure and the praise. In such case how do you think the young man's heart, as the saying is, is moved within him? What private teaching do you think will hold out and not rather be swept away by the torrent of censure and applause, and borne off on its current, so that he will affirm the same things that they do to be honorable and base, [492d] and will do as they do, and be even such as they?” “That is quite inevitable, Socrates,” he said.

“And, moreover,” I said, “we have not yet mentioned the chief necessity and compulsion.” “What is it?” said he. “That which these ‘educators’ and sophists impose by action when their words fail to convince. Don't you know that they chastise the recalcitrant with loss of civic rights and fines and death?” “They most emphatically do,” he said. “What other sophist, then, or what private teaching do you think [492e] will prevail in opposition to these?” “None, I fancy,” said he. “No,” said I, “the very attempt is the height of folly. For there is not, never has been and never will be, a divergent type of character and virtue created by an education running counter to theirs—humanly speaking, I mean, my friend; for the divine, as the proverb says, all rules fail. And you may be sure that, if anything is saved and turns out well [493a] in the present condition of society and government, in saying that the providence of God preserves it you will not be speaking ill.” “Neither do I think otherwise,” he said. “Then,” said I, “think this also in addition.” “What?” “Each of these private teachers who work for pay, whom the politicians call sophists and regard as their rivals, inculcates nothing else than these opinions of the multitude which they opine when they are assembled and calls this knowledge wisdom. It is as if a man were acquiring the knowledge of the humors and desires of a great strong beast which he had in his keeping, [493b] how it is to be approached and touched, and when and by what things it is made most savage or gentle, yes, and the several sounds it is wont to utter on the occasion of each, and again what sounds uttered by another make it tame or fierce, and after mastering this knowledge by living with the creature and by lapse of time should call it wisdom, and should construct thereof a system and art and turn to the teaching of it, knowing nothing in reality about which of these opinions and desires is honorable or base, good or evil, just or unjust, [493c] but should apply all these terms to the judgements of the great beast, calling the things that pleased it good, and the things that vexed it bad, having no other account to render of them, but should call what is necessary just and honorable, never having observed how great is the real difference between the necessary and the good, and being incapable of explaining it to another. Do you not think, by heaven, that such a one would be a strange educator?” “I do,” he said. “Do you suppose that there is any difference between such a one and the man who thinks [493d] that it is wisdom to have learned to know the moods and the pleasures of the motley multitude in their assembly, whether about painting or music or, for that matter, politics? For if a man associates with these and offers and exhibits to them his poetry or any other product of his craft or any political. service, and grants the mob authority over himself more than is unavoidable, the proverbial necessity of Diomede will compel him to give the public what it likes, but that what it likes is really good and honorable, have you ever heard an attempted proof of this that is not simply ridiculous?” [493e] “No,” he said, “and I fancy I never shall hear it either.”

“Bearing all this in mind, recall our former question. Can the multitude possibly tolerate or believe in the reality of the beautiful in itself as opposed to the multiplicity of beautiful things, or can they believe in anything conceived in its essence as opposed to the many particulars?” “Not in the least,” he said. “Philosophy, then, the love of wisdom, [494a] is impossible for the multitude.” “Impossible.” “It is inevitable, then, that those who philosophize should be censured by them.” “Inevitable.” “And so likewise by those laymen who, associating with the mob, desire to curry favor with it.” “Obviously.” “From this point of view do you see any salvation that will suffer the born philosopher to abide in the pursuit and persevere to the end? Consider it in the light of what we said before. [494b] We agreed that quickness in learning, memory, courage and magnificence were the traits of this nature.” “Yes.” “Then even as a boy among boys such a one will take the lead in all things, especially if the nature of his body matches the soul.” “How could he fail to do so?” he said. “His kinsmen and fellow-citizens, then, will desire, I presume, to make use of him when he is older for their own affairs.” “Of course.” [494c] “Then they will fawn upon him with petitions and honors, anticipating and flattering the power that will be his.” “That certainly is the usual way.” “How, then, do you think such a youth will behave in such conditions, especially if it happen that he belongs to a great city and is rich and well-born therein, and thereto handsome and tall? Will his soul not be filled with unbounded ambitious hopes, and will he not think himself capable of managing the affairs of both Greeks and barbarians, [494d] and thereupon exalt himself, haughty of mien and stuffed with empty pride and void of sense. “He surely will,” he said. “And if to a man in this state of mind someone gently comes and tells him what is the truth, that he has no sense and sorely needs it, and that the only way to get it is to work like a slave to win it, do you think it will be easy for him to lend an ear to the quiet voice in the midst of and in spite of these evil surroundings “Far from it,” said he. “And even supposing,” said I, “that owing to a fortunate disposition and his affinity for the words of admonition [494e] one such youth apprehends something and is moved and drawn towards philosophy, what do we suppose will be the conduct of those who think that they are losing his service and fellowship? Is there any word or deed that they will stick at to keep him from being persuaded and to incapacitate anyone who attempts it, both by private intrigue and public prosecution in the court?”

[495a] “That is inevitable,” he said. “Is there any possibility of such a one continuing to philosophize?” “None at all,” he said.

“Do you see, then,” said I,” that we were not wrong in saying that the very qualities that make up the philosophical nature do, in fact, become, when the environment and nurture are bad, in some sort the cause of its backsliding, and so do the so-called goods— riches and all such instrumentalities?” “No,” he replied, “it was rightly said.” “Such, my good friend, and so great as regards the noblest pursuit, [495b] is the destruction and corruption of the most excellent nature, which is rare enough in any case, as we affirm. And it is from men of this type that those spring who do the greatest harm to communities and individuals, and the greatest good when the stream chances to be turned into that channel, but a small nature never does anything great to a man or a city.” “Most true,” said he. [495c] “Those, then, to whom she properly belongs, thus falling away and leaving philosophy forlorn and unwedded, themselves live an unreal and alien life, while other unworthy wooers rush in and defile her as an orphan bereft of her kin, and attach to her such reproaches as you say her revilers taunt her with, declaring that some of her consorts are of no account and the many accountable for many evils.” “Why, yes,” he replied, “that is what they do say.” “And plausibly,” said I; “for other mannikins, observing that the place is unoccupied and full of fine terms and pretensions, [495d] just as men escape from prison to take sanctuary in temples, so these gentlemen joyously bound away from the mechanical arts to philosophy, those that are most cunning in their little craft. For in comparison with the other arts the prestige of philosophy even in her present low estate retains a superior dignity; and this is the ambition and aspiration of that multitude of pretenders unfit by nature, whose souls are bowed and mutilated by their vulgar occupations [495e] even as their bodies are marred by their arts and crafts. Is not that inevitable?” “Quite so,” he said. “Is not the picture which they present,” I said, “precisely that of a little bald-headed tinker who has made money and just been freed from bonds and had a bath and is wearing a new garment and has got himself up like a bridegroom and is about to marry his master's daughter [496a] who has fallen into poverty and abandonment?” “There is no difference at all,” he said. “Of what sort will probably be the offspring of such parents?” “Will they not be bastard and base?” “Inevitably.” “And so when men unfit for culture approach philosophy and consort with her unworthily, what sort of ideas and opinions shall we say they beget? Will they not produce what may in very deed be fairly called sophisms, and nothing that is genuine or that partakes of true intelligence?” “Quite so,” he said.

“There is a very small remnant, then, Adeimantus,” I said, [496b] “of those who consort worthily with philosophy, some well-born and well-bred nature, it may be, held in check by exile, and so in the absence of corrupters remaining true to philosophy, as its quality bids, or it may happen that a great soul born in a little town scorns and disregards its parochial affairs; and a small group perhaps might by natural affinity be drawn to it from other arts which they justly disdain; and the bridle of our companion Theages also might operate as a restraint. For in the case of Theages all other conditions were at hand [496c] for his backsliding from philosophy, but his sickly habit of body keeping him out of politics holds him back. My own case, the divine sign, is hardly worth mentioning—for I suppose it has happened to few or none before me. And those who have been of this little company and have tasted the sweetness and blessedness of this possession and who have also come to understand the madness of the multitude sufficiently and have seen that there is nothing, if I may say so, sound or right in any present politics, and that there is no ally [496d] with whose aid the champion of justice could escape destruction, but that he would be as a man who has fallen among wild beasts, unwilling to share their misdeeds and unable to hold out singly against the savagery of all, and that he would thus, before he could in any way benefit his friends or the state come to an untimely end without doing any good to himself or others,—for all these reasons I say the philosopher remains quiet, minds his own affair, and, as it were, standing aside under shelter of a wall in a storm and blast of dust and sleet and seeing others filled full of lawlessness, is content if in any way [496e] he may keep himself free from iniquity and unholy deeds through this life and take his departure with fair hope, serene and well content when the end comes.” “Well,” he said, “that is no very slight thing [497a] to have achieved before taking his departure.” “He would not have accomplished any very great thing either,” I replied, “if it were not his fortune to live in a state adapted to his nature. In such a state only will he himself rather attain his full stature and together with his own preserve the common weal.

“The causes and the injustice of the calumniation of philosophy, I think, have been fairly set forth, unless you have something to add.” “No,” he said, “I have nothing further to offer on that point. But which of our present governments do you think is suitable for philosophy?” [497b] “None whatever,” I said; “but the very ground of my complaint is that no polity of today is worthy of the philosophic nature. This is just the cause of its perversion and alteration; as a foreign seed sown in an alien soil is wont to be overcome and die out into the native growth, so this kind does not preserve its own quality but falls away and degenerates into an alien type. But if ever [497c] it finds the best polity as it itself is the best, then will it be apparent that this was in truth divine and all the others human in their natures and practices. Obviously then you are next, going to ask what is this best form of government.” “Wrong,” he said “I was going to ask not that but whether it is this one that we have described in our establishment of a state or another.” “In other respects it is this one,” said I; “but there is one special further point that we mentioned even then, namely that there would always have to be resident in such a state an element [497d] having the same conception of its constitution that you the lawgiver had in framing its laws.” “That was said,” he replied. “But it was not sufficiently explained,” I said, “from fear of those objections on your part which have shown that the demonstration of it is long and difficult. And apart from that the remainder of the exposition is by no means easy.” “Just what do you mean?” “The manner in which a state that occupies itself with philosophy can escape destruction. For all great things are precarious and, as the proverb truly says, fine things are hard.” “All the same,” [497e] he said, “our exposition must be completed by making this plain.” “It will be no lack of will,” I said, “but if anything, a lack of ability, that would prevent that. But you shall observe for yourself my zeal. And note again how zealously and recklessly I am prepared to say that the state ought to take up this pursuit in just the reverse of our present fashion.” “In what way?” “At present,” [498a] said I, “those who do take it up are youths, just out of boyhood, who in the interval before they engage in business and money-making approach the most difficult part of it, and then drop it—and these are regarded forsooth as the best exemplars of philosophy. By the most difficult part I mean discussion. In later life they think they have done much if, when invited, they deign to listen to the philosophic discussions of others. That sort of thing they think should be by-work. And towards old age, with few exceptions, their light is quenched more completely [498b] than the sun of Heracleitus, inasmuch as it is never rekindled.” “And what should they do?” he said. “Just the reverse. While they are lads and boys they should occupy themselves with an education and a culture suitable to youth, and while their bodies are growing to manhood take right good care of them, thus securing a basis and a support for the intellectual life. But with the advance of age, when the soul begins to attain its maturity, they should make its exercises more severe, and when [498c] the bodily strength declines and they are past the age of political and military service, then at last they should be given free range of the pasture and do nothing but philosophize, except incidentally, if they are to live happily, and, when the end has come, crown the life they have lived with a consonant destiny in that other world.”

“You really seem to be very much in earnest, Socrates,” he said; yet I think most of your hearers are even more earnest in their opposition and will not be in the least convinced, beginning with Thrasymachus.” “Do not try to breed a quarrel between me and Thrasymachus, [498d] who have just become friends and were not enemies before either. For we will spare no effort until we either convince him and the rest or achieve something that will profit them when they come to that life in which they will be born again and meet with such discussions as these.” “A brief time your forecast contemplates,” he said. “Nay, nothing at all,” I replied, “as compared with eternity. However, the unwillingness of the multitude to believe what you say is nothing surprising. For of the thing here spoken they have never beheld a token, [498e] but only the forced and artificial chiming of word and phrase, not spontaneous and accidental as has happened here. But the figure of a man ‘equilibrated’ and ‘assimilated’ to virtue's self perfectly, so far as may be, in word and deed, and holding rule in a city of like quality, that is a thing they have never seen [499a] in one case or in many. Do you think they have?” “By no means.” “Neither, my dear fellow, have they ever seriously inclined to hearken to fair and free discussions whose sole endeavor was to search out the truth at any cost for knowledge's sake, and which dwell apart and salute from afar all the subtleties and cavils that lead to naught but opinion and strife in court-room and in private talk.” “They have not,” he said. [499b] “For this cause and foreseeing this, we then despite our fears declared under compulsion of the truth that neither city nor polity nor man either will ever be perfected until some chance compels this uncorrupted remnant of philosophers, who now bear the stigma of uselessness, to take charge of the state whether they wish it or not, and constrains the citizens to obey them, or else until by some divine inspiration a genuine passion for true philosophy takes possession [499c] either of the sons of the men now in power and sovereignty or of themselves. To affirm that either or both of these things cannot possibly come to pass is, I say, quite unreasonable. Only in that case could we be justly ridiculed as uttering things as futile as day-dreams are. Is not that so?” “It is.” “If, then, the best philosophical natures have ever been constrained to take charge of the state in infinite time past, or now are in some barbaric region [499d] far beyond our ken, or shall hereafter be, we are prepared to maintain our contention that the constitution we have described has been, is, or will be realized when this philosophic Muse has taken control of the state. It is not a thing impossible to happen, nor are we speaking of impossibilities. That it is difficult we too admit.” “I also think so,” he said. “But the multitude—are you going to say?—does not think so,” said I. “That may be,” he said. “My dear fellow,” [499e] said I, “do not thus absolutely condemn the multitude. They will surely be of another mind if in no spirit of contention but soothingly and endeavoring to do away with the dispraise of learning you point out to them whom you mean by philosophers, and define as we recently did their nature [500a] and their pursuits so that the people may not suppose you to mean those of whom they are thinking. Or even if they do look at them in that way, are you still going to deny that they will change their opinion and answer differently? Or do you think that anyone is ungentle to the gentle or grudging to the ungrudging if he himself is ungrudging and mild? I will anticipate you and reply that I think that only in some few and not in the mass of mankind is so ungentle or harsh a temper to be found.” “And I, you may be assured,” [500b] he said, “concur.” “And do you not also concur in this very point that the blame for this harsh attitude of the many towards philosophy falls on that riotous crew who have burst in where they do not belong, wrangling with one another, filled with spite and always talking about persons, a thing least befitting philosophy?” “Least of all, indeed,” he said.

“For surely, Adeimantus, the man whose mind is truly fixed on eternal realities has no leisure [500c] to turn his eyes downward upon the petty affairs of men, and so engaging in strife with them to be filled with envy and hate, but he fixes his gaze upon the things of the eternal and unchanging order, and seeing that they neither wrong nor are wronged by one another, but all abide in harmony as reason bids, he will endeavor to imitate them and, as far as may be, to fashion himself in their likeness and assimilate himself to them. Or do you think it possible not to imitate the things to which anyone attaches himself with admiration?” “Impossible,” he said. “Then the lover of wisdom [500d] associating with the divine order will himself become orderly and divine in the measure permitted to man. But calumny is plentiful everywhere.” “Yes, truly.” “If, then,” I said, “some compulsion is laid upon him to practise stamping on the plastic matter of human nature in public and private the patterns that he visions there, and not merely to mould and fashion himself, do you think he will prove a poor craftsman of sobriety and justice and all forms of ordinary civic virtue?” “By no means,” he said. “But if the multitude become aware [500e] that what we are saying of the philosopher is true, will they still be harsh with philosophers, and will they distrust our statement that no city could ever be blessed unless its lineaments were traced by artists who used the heavenly model?” “They will not be harsh,” [501a] he said, “if they perceive that. But tell me, what is the manner of that sketch you have in mind?” “They will take the city and the characters of men, as they might a tablet, and first wipe it clean— no easy task. But at any rate you know that this would be their first point of difference from ordinary reformers, that they would refuse to take in hand either individual or state or to legislate before they either received a clean slate or themselves made it clean.” “And they would be right,” he said. “And thereafter, do you not think that they would sketch the figure of the constitution?” “Surely.” “And then, [501b] I take it, in the course of the work they would glance frequently in either direction, at justice, beauty, sobriety and the like as they are in the nature of things, and alternately at that which they were trying to reproduce in mankind, mingling and blending from various pursuits that hue of the flesh, so to speak, deriving their judgement from that likeness of humanity which Homer too called when it appeared in men the image and likeness of God.” “Right,” he said. “And they would erase one touch or stroke and paint in another [501c] until in the measure of the possible they had made the characters of men pleasing and dear to God as may be.” “That at any rate would be the fairest painting.” “Are we then making any impression on those who you said were advancing to attack us with might and main? Can we convince them that such a political artist of character and such a painter exists as the one we then were praising when our proposal to entrust the state to him angered them, and are they now in a gentler mood when they hear what we are now saying?” “Much gentler,” [501d] he said, “if they are reasonable.” “How can they controvert it? Will they deny that the lovers of wisdom are lovers of reality and truth?” “That would be monstrous,” he said. “Or that their nature as we have portrayed it is akin to the highest and best?” “Not that either.” “Well, then, can they deny that such a nature bred in the pursuits that befit it will be perfectly good and philosophic so far as that can be said of anyone? Or will they rather say it of those whom we have excluded?” [501e] “Surely not.” “Will they, then, any longer be fierce with us when we declare that, until the philosophic class wins control, there will be no surcease of trouble for city or citizens nor will the polity which we fable in words be brought to pass in deed?” “They will perhaps be less so,” he said. “Instead of less so, may we not say that they have been altogether tamed and convinced, so that [502a] for very shame, if for no other reason, they may assent?” “Certainly,” said he.

“Let us assume, then,” said I, “that they are won over to this view. Will anyone contend that there is no chance that the offspring of kings and rulers should be born with the philosophic nature?” “Not one,” he said. “And can anyone prove that if so born they must necessarily be corrupted? The difficulty of their salvation we too concede; but that in all the course of time [502b] not one of all could be saved, will anyone maintain that?” “How could he?” “But surely,” said I, “the occurrence of one such is enough, if he has a state which obeys him, to realize all that now seems so incredible.” “Yes, one is enough,” he said. “For if such a ruler,” I said, “ordains the laws and institutions that we have described it is surely not impossible that the citizens should be content to carry them out.” “By no means.” “Would it, then, be at all strange or impossible for others to come to the opinion to which we have come?” [502c] “I think not,” said he. “And further that these things are best, if possible, has already, I take it, been sufficiently shown.” “Yes, sufficiently.” “Our present opinion, then, about this legislation is that our plan would be best if it could be realized and that this realization is difficult yet not impossible.” “That is the conclusion,” he said.

“This difficulty disposed of, we have next [502d] to speak of what remains, in what way, namely, and as a result of what studies and pursuits, these preservers of the constitution will form a part of our state, and at what ages they will severally take up each study.” “Yes, we have to speak of that,” he said. “I gained nothing,” I said, “by my cunning in omitting heretofore the distasteful topic of the possession of women and procreation of children and the appointment of rulers, because I knew that the absolutely true and right way would provoke censure and is difficult of realization; [502e] for now I am none the less compelled to discuss them. The matter of the women and children has been disposed of, but the education of the rulers has to be examined again, I may say, from the starting-point. We were saying, if you recollect, [503a] that they must approve themselves lovers of the state when tested in pleasures and pains, and make it apparent that they do not abandon this fixed faith under stress of labors or fears or any other vicissitude, and that anyone who could not keep that faith must he rejected, while he who always issued from the test pure and intact, like gold tried in the fire, is to be established as ruler and to receive honors in life and after death and prizes as well. Something of this sort we said while the argument slipped by with veiled face [503b] in fear of starting our present debate.” “Most true,” he said; “I remember.” “We shrank, my friend,” I said, “from uttering the audacities which have now been hazarded. But now let us find courage for the definitive pronouncement that as the most perfect guardians we must establish philosophers.” “Yes, assume it to have been said,” said he. “Note, then, that they will naturally be few, for the different components of the nature which we said their education presupposed rarely consent to grow in one; but for the most part these qualities are found apart.” [503c] “What do you mean?” he said. “Facility in learning, memory, sagacity, quickness of apprehension and their accompaniments, and youthful spirit and magnificence in soul are qualities, you know, that are rarely combined in human nature with a disposition to live orderly, quiet, and stable lives; but such men, by reason of their quickness, are driven about just as chance directs, and all steadfastness is gone out of them.” “You speak truly,” he said. “And on the other hand, the steadfast and stable temperaments, whom one could rather trust in use, [503d] and who in war are not easily moved and aroused to fear, are apt to act in the same way when confronted with studies. They are not easily aroused, learn with difficulty, as if benumbed, and are filled with sleep and yawning when an intellectual task is set them.” “It is so,” he said. “But we affirmed that a man must partake of both temperaments in due and fair combination or else participate in neither the highest education nor in honors nor in rule.” “And rightly,” he said. “Do you not think, then, that such a blend will be a rare thing?” [503e] “Of course.” “They must, then, be tested in the toils and fears and pleasures of which we then spoke, and we have also now to speak of a point we then passed by, that we must exercise them in many studies, watching them to see whether their nature is capable of enduring the greatest and most difficult studies [504a] or whether it will faint and flinch as men flinch in the trials and contests of the body.” “That is certainly the right way of looking at it,” he said. “But what do you understand by the greatest studies?”

“You remember, I presume,” said I, “that after distinguishing three kinds in the soul, we established definitions of justice, sobriety, bravery and wisdom severally.” “If I did not remember,” he said, “I should not deserve to hear the rest.” “Do you also remember [504b] what was said before this?” “What?” “We were saying, I believe, that for the most perfect discernment of these things another longer way was requisite which would make them plain to one who took it, but that it was possible to add proofs on a par with the preceding discussion. And you said that that was sufficient, and it was on this understanding that what we then said was said, falling short of ultimate precision as it appeared to me, but if it contented you it is for you to say.” “Well,” he said, “it was measurably satisfactory to me, and apparently [504c] to the rest of the company.” “Nay, my friend,” said I, “a measure of such things that in the least degree falls short of reality proves no measure at all. For nothing that is imperfect is the measure of anything, though some people sometimes think that they have already done enough and that there is no need of further inquiry.” “Yes, indeed,” he said, “many experience this because of their sloth.” “An experience,” said I, “that least of all befits the guardians of a state and of its laws.” “That seems likely,” he said. “Then,” said I, “such a one must go around [504d] the longer way and must labor no less in studies than in the exercises of the body or else, as we were just saying, he will never come to the end of the greatest study and that which most properly belongs to him.” “Why, are not these things the greatest?” said he; “but is there still something greater than justice and the other virtues we described?” “There is not only something greater,” I said, “but of these very things we need not merely to contemplate an outline as now, but we must omit nothing of their most exact elaboration. Or would it not be absurd to strain every nerve to attain [504e] to the utmost precision and clarity of knowledge about other things of trifling moment and not to demand the greatest precision for the greatest matters?” “It would indeed,” he said; “but do you suppose that anyone will let you go without asking what is the greatest study and with what you think it is concerned?” “By no means,” said I; “but do you ask the question. You certainly have heard it often, but now you either do not apprehend or again you are minded to make trouble for me [505a] by attacking the argument. I suspect it is rather the latter. For you have often heard that the greatest thing to learn is the idea of good by reference to which just things and all the rest become useful and beneficial. And now I am almost sure you know that this is what I am going to speak of and to say further that we have no adequate knowledge of it. And if we do not know it, then, even if without the knowledge of this we should know all other things never so well, you are aware that it would avail us nothing, [505b] just as no possession either is of any avail without the possession of the good. Or do you think there is any profit in possessing everything except that which is good, or in understanding all things else apart from the good while understanding and knowing nothing that is fair and good?” “No, by Zeus, I do not,” he said.

“But, furthermore, you know this too, that the multitude believe pleasure to be the good, and the finer spirits intelligence or knowledge.” “Certainly.” “And you are also aware, my friend, that those who hold this latter view are not able to point out what knowledge it is but are finally compelled to say that it is the knowledge of the good.” “Most absurdly,” he said. “Is it not absurd,” [505c] said I, “if while taunting us with our ignorance of the good they turn about and talk to us as if we knew it? For they say it is the knowledge of the good, as if we understood their meaning when they utter the word ‘good.'” “Most true,” he said. “Well, are those who define the good as pleasure infected with any less confusion of thought than the others? Or are not they in like manner compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures?” “Most assuredly.” “The outcome is, I take it, that they are admitting [505d] the same things to be both good and bad, are they not?” “Certainly.” “Then is it not apparent that there are many and violent disputes about it?” “Of course.” “And again, is it not apparent that while in the case of the just and the honorable many would prefer the semblance without the reality in action, possession, and opinion, yet when it comes to the good nobody is content with the possession of the appearance but all men seek the reality, and the semblance satisfies nobody here?” [505e] “Quite so,” he said. “That, then, which every soul pursues and for its sake does all that it does, with an intuition of its reality, but yet baffled and unable to apprehend its nature adequately, or to attain to any stable belief about it as about other things, and for that reason failing of any possible benefit from other things,— [506a] in a matter of this quality and moment, can we, I ask you, allow a like blindness and obscurity in those best citizens to whose hands we are to entrust all things?” “Least of all,” he said. “I fancy, at any rate,” said I, “that the just and the honorable, if their relation and reference to the good is not known, will not have secured a guardian of much worth in the man thus ignorant, and my surmise is that no one will understand them adequately before he knows this.” “You surmise well,” he said. “Then our constitution [506b] will have its perfect and definitive organization only when such a guardian, who knows these things, oversees it.”

“Necessarily,” he said. “But you yourself, Socrates, do you think that knowledge is the good or pleasure or something else and different?” “What a man it is,” said I; “you made it very plain long ago that you would not be satisfied with what others think about it.” “Why, it does not seem right to me either, Socrates,” he said, “to be ready to state the opinions of others but not one's own when one has occupied himself with the matter so long.” [506c] “But then,” said I, “do you think it right to speak as having knowledge about things one does not know?” “By no means,” he said, “as having knowledge, but one ought to be willing to tell as his opinion what he opines.” “Nay,” said I, “have you not observed that opinions divorced from knowledge are ugly things? The best of them are blind. Or do you think that those who hold some true opinion without intelligence differ appreciably from blind men who go the right way?” “They do not differ at all,” he said. “Is it, then, ugly things that you prefer [506d] to contemplate, things blind and crooked, when you might hear from others what is luminous and fair?” “Nay, in heaven's name, Socrates,” said Glaucon, “do not draw back, as it were, at the very goal. For it will content us if you explain the good even as you set forth the nature of justice, sobriety, and the other virtues.” “It will right well content me, my dear fellow,” I said, “but I fear that my powers may fail and that in my eagerness I may cut a sorry figure and become a laughing-stock. Nay, my beloved, [506e] let us dismiss for the time being the nature of the good in itself; for to attain to my present surmise of that seems a pitch above the impulse that wings my flight today. But of what seems to be the offspring of the good and most nearly made in its likeness I am willing to speak if you too wish it, and otherwise to let the matter drop.” “Well, speak on,” he said, “for you will duly pay me the tale of the parent another time.” “I could wish,” [507a] I said, “that I were able to make and you to receive the payment and not merely as now the interest. But at any rate receive this interest and the offspring of the good. Have a care, however, lest I deceive you unintentionally with a false reckoning of the interest.” “We will do our best,” he said, “to be on our guard. Only speak on.” “Yes,” I said, “after first coming to an understanding with you and reminding you of what has been said here before and often on other occasions.” [507b] “What?” said he. “We predicate ‘to be’ of many beautiful things and many good things, saying of them severally that they are, and so define them in our speech.” “We do.” “And again, we speak of a self-beautiful and of a good that is only and merely good, and so, in the case of all the things that we then posited as many, we turn about and posit each as a single idea or aspect, assuming it to be a unity and call it that which each really is. “It is so.” “And the one class of things we say can be seen but not thought, [507c] while the ideas can be thought but not seen.” “By all means.” “With which of the parts of ourselves, with which of our faculties, then, do we see visible things?” “With sight,” he said. “And do we not,” I said, “hear audibles with hearing, and perceive all sensibles with the other senses?” “Surely.” “Have you ever observed,” said I, “how much the greatest expenditure the creator of the senses has lavished on the faculty of seeing and being seen? “Why, no, I have not,” he said. “Well, look at it thus. Do hearing and voice stand in need of another medium so that the one may hear and the other be heard, [507d] in the absence of which third element the one will not hear and the other not be heard?” “They need nothing,” he said. “Neither, I fancy,” said I,” do many others, not to say that none require anything of the sort. Or do you know of any?” “Not I,” he said. “But do you not observe that vision and the visible do have this further need?” “How?” “Though vision may be in the eyes and its possessor may try to use it, and though color be present, yet without [507e] the presence of a third thing specifically and naturally adapted to this purpose, you are aware that vision will see nothing and the colors will remain invisible.” “What is this thing of which you speak?” he said. “The thing,” I said, “that you call light.” “You say truly,” he replied. “The bond, then, that yokes together [508a] visibility and the faculty of sight is more precious by no slight form that which unites the other pairs, if light is not without honor.” “It surely is far from being so,” he said.

“Which one can you name of the divinities in heaven as the author and cause of this, whose light makes our vision see best and visible things to be seen?” “Why, the one that you too and other people mean,” he said; “for your question evidently refers to the sun.” “Is not this, then, the relation of vision to that divinity?” “What?” “Neither vision itself nor its vehicle, which we call the eye, is identical with the sun.” [508b] “Why, no.” “But it is, I think, the most sunlike of all the instruments of sense.” “By far the most.” “And does it not receive the power which it possesses as an influx, as it were, dispensed from the sun?” “Certainly.” “Is it not also true that the sun is not vision, yet as being the cause thereof is beheld by vision itself?” “That is so,” he said. “This, then, you must understand that I meant by the offspring of the good which the good [508c] begot to stand in a proportion with itself: as the good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision.” “How is that?” he said; “explain further.” “You are aware,” I said, “that when the eyes are no longer turned upon objects upon whose colors the light of day falls but that of the dim luminaries of night, their edge is blunted and they appear almost blind, as if pure vision did not dwell in them.” “Yes, indeed,” he said. “But when, I take it, [508d] they are directed upon objects illumined by the sun, they see clearly, and vision appears to reside in these same eyes.” “Certainly.” “Apply this comparison to the soul also in this way. When it is firmly fixed on the domain where truth and reality shine resplendent it apprehends and knows them and appears to possess reason; but when it inclines to that region which is mingled with darkness, the world of becoming and passing away, it opines only and its edge is blunted, and it shifts its opinions hither and thither, and again seems as if it lacked reason.” [508e] “Yes, it does,” “This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the idea of good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as known. Yet fair as they both are, knowledge and truth, in supposing it to be something fairer still than these you will think rightly of it. But as for knowledge and truth, even as in our illustration [509a] it is right to deem light and vision sunlike, but never to think that they are the sun, so here it is right to consider these two their counterparts, as being like the good or boniform, but to think that either of them is the good is not right. Still higher honor belongs to the possession and habit of the good.” “An inconceivable beauty you speak of,” he said, “if it is the source of knowledge and truth, and yet itself surpasses them in beauty. For you surely cannot mean that it is pleasure.” “Hush,” said I, “but examine [509b] the similitude of it still further in this way.” “How?” “The sun, I presume you will say, not only furnishes to visibles the power of visibility but it also provides for their generation and growth and nurture though it is not itself generation.” “Of course not.” “In like manner, then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not essence but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power.” [509c]

And Glaucon very ludicrously said, “Heaven save us, hyperbole can no further go.” “The fault is yours,” I said, “for compelling me to utter my thoughts about it.” “And don't desist,” he said, “but at least expound the similitude of the sun, if there is anything that you are omitting.” “Why, certainly,” I said, “I am omitting a great deal.” “Well, don't omit the least bit,” he said. “I fancy,” I said, “that I shall have to pass over much, but nevertheless so far as it is at present practicable I shall not willingly leave anything out.” “Do not,” [509d] he said. “Conceive then,” said I, “as we were saying, that there are these two entities, and that one of them is sovereign over the intelligible order and region and the other over the world of the eye-ball, not to say the sky-ball, but let that pass. You surely apprehend the two types, the visible and the intelligible.” “I do.” “Represent them then, as it were, by a line divided into two unequal sections and cut each section again in the same ratio (the section, that is, of the visible and that of the intelligible order), and then as an expression of the ratio of their comparative clearness and obscurity you will have, as one of the sections [509e] of the visible world, images. By images I mean, [510a] first, shadows, and then reflections in water and on surfaces of dense, smooth and bright texture, and everything of that kind, if you apprehend.” “I do.” “As the second section assume that of which this is a likeness or an image, that is, the animals about us and all plants and the whole class of objects made by man.” “I so assume it,” he said. “Would you be willing to say,” said I, “that the division in respect of reality and truth or the opposite is expressed by the proportion: as is the opinable to the knowable so is the likeness to that [510b] of which it is a likeness?” “I certainly would.” “Consider then again the way in which we are to make the division of the intelligible section.” “In what way?” “By the distinction that there is one section of it which the soul is compelled to investigate by treating as images the things imitated in the former division, and by means of assumptions from which it proceeds not up to a first principle but down to a conclusion, while there is another section in which it advances from its assumption to a beginning or principle that transcends assumption, and in which it makes no use of the images employed by the other section, relying on ideas only and progressing systematically through ideas.” “I don't fully understand what you mean by this,” he said. “Well, I will try again,” [510c] said I,” for you will better understand after this preamble. For I think you are aware that students of geometry and reckoning and such subjects first postulate the odd and the even and the various figures and three kinds of angles and other things akin to these in each branch of science, regard them as known, and, treating them as absolute assumptions, do not deign to render any further account of them to themselves or others, taking it for granted that they are obvious to everybody. They take their start [510d] from these, and pursuing the inquiry from this point on consistently, conclude with that for the investigation of which they set out.” “Certainly,” he said, “I know that.” “And do you not also know that they further make use of the visible forms and talk about them, though they are not thinking of them but of those things of which they are a likeness, pursuing their inquiry for the sake of the square as such and the diagonal as such, and not for the sake of the image of it which they draw? [510e] And so in all cases. The very things which they mould and draw, which have shadows and images of themselves in water, these things they treat in their turn as only images, but what they really seek is to get sight of those realities which can be seen [511a] only by the mind.” “True,” he said.

“This then is the class that I described as intelligible, it is true, but with the reservation first that the soul is compelled to employ assumptions in the investigation of it, not proceeding to a first principle because of its inability to extricate itself from and rise above its assumptions, and second, that it uses as images or likenesses the very objects that are themselves copied and adumbrated by the class below them, and that in comparison with these latter are esteemed as clear and held in honor.” “I understand,” [511b] said he, “that you are speaking of what falls under geometry and the kindred arts.” “Understand then,” said I, “that by the other section of the intelligible I mean that which the reason itself lays hold of by the power of dialectics, treating its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses, underpinnings, footings, and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting-point of all, and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion, [511c] making no use whatever of any object of sense but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas.” “I understand,” he said; “not fully, for it is no slight task that you appear to have in mind, but I do understand that you mean to distinguish the aspect of reality and the intelligible, which is contemplated by the power of dialectic, as something truer and more exact than the object of the so-called arts and sciences whose assumptions are arbitrary starting-points. And though it is true that those who contemplate them are compelled to use their understanding and not [511d] their senses, yet because they do not go back to the beginning in the study of them but start from assumptions you do not think they possess true intelligence about them although the things themselves are intelligibles when apprehended in conjunction with a first principle. And I think you call the mental habit of geometers and their like mind or understanding and not reason because you regard understanding as something intermediate between opinion and reason.” “Your interpretation is quite sufficient,” I said; “and now, answering to these four sections, assume these four affections occurring in the soul: intellection or reason for the highest, [511e] understanding for the second; assign belief to the third, and to the last picture-thinking or conjecture, and arrange them in a proportion, considering that they participate in clearness and precision in the same degree as their objects partake of truth and reality.” “I understand,” he said; “I concur and arrange them as you bid.”

Comments
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AristotlePlato
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Connect Plato’s example of the “students of geometry” using hypotheses and first principles in the intelligible subsection of “thought” in the Analogy of the Divided Line (510b (Greek)) to Aristotle’s position that all knowledge “. . . received by way of argument proceeds from pre-existent knowledge” (Posterior Analytics I.1 71a1-2 (Greek)). (Sean Ryan, Sofia Reynolds, Sam Sullivan)

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Connect Plato’s distinction between first principles and hypotheses (510b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of first principles as true and primary premises (Topics I.1 100b18-21 (Greek)). (Justin Kahn, Ben Leikind, and Jinnie Mannion)

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Connect Plato’s criticism of the view that the good is pleasure (505c-d (Greek)) with Epicurus’s account of the good as pleasure (Letter Menoeceus, DL X.128-132 (Greek)). (Justin Kahn, Ben Leikind, and Jinnie Mannion)

AristotleEpicurusPlatoPyrrhonian SkepticsStoics
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Connect Socrates’ discussion of the Form of the Good (505a ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s picture of the chief human good (NE I.1-2 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

Connect Plato’s discussion of the form of the good (505a-505e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s argument about the two senses of nature, form and matter (Physics II.1 192b33-193b21 (Greek)). (Cass Novello, Malahim, and Stella Chiari)

Connect Plato’s discussion of the form of the good (505a ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s criticisms of the idea of the Form of the Good (NE I.6 (Greek)). (Amy Li and Chuyan Wang)

Connect Socrates’ discussion of the Form of the Good (505a ff. (Greek)) with Epicurus’s view of the good as what we do everything for the sake of, and what we refer every choice and avoidance to, namely, “the health of the body and the freedom of the soul from disturbance” (Letter to Menoeceus, DL X.128 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

Connect Socrates’ discussion of the Form of the Good (505a ff. (Greek)) with the Stoic view that the good is the beneficial, namely, “that which is perfectly in accord with nature for a rational being, qua rational” (DL 7.94) and that it is “the goal” of life (DL VII.87-88 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

Connect Socrates’ discussion of the Form of the Good (505a ff. (Greek)) with Sextus Empiricus’s investigations into the good and the bad (PH III.168-238 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

Connect Socrates’ discussion of the Form of the Good (505a-e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s commentary on the Idea of the Good (EE I.8 1217b1-15 (Greek)). (Stella Chiari)

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Connect Socrates’s claim that people with the best nature do the greatest evils when they are brought up badly (495a-b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s statement that when men, the best of animals, are brought up without laws or justice, become the worst of all animals (Politics I.2 1253a31-39 (Greek)). (Ozy Odocha)

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Connect Socrates’ claim that “the best endowed souls become worse than the others under a bad education” (491e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that man becomes most savage when using the ‘arms’ given at birth for injustice rather than intelligence and excellence (Politics I.2 1253a31-37 (Greek)). (Lauren Kim)

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Connect Plato’s requiring “appropriate teaching” for the development of virtue (492a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s requiring “teaching” for the “birth” and “growth” of intellectual virtue. (NE II.1 1103a14-15 (Greek)). (Sean Ryan, Sofia Reynolds, Sam Sullivan)

AristotlePlatoXenophon
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Connect Socrates' ship of state metaphor (488b-e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s likening of citizens to sailors (Politics III.4 1276b20-27 (Greek)). (Corinne Gartner)

Connect Socrates' ship of state metaphor (488b-e (Greek)) with Xenophon’s remark that on a ship the ruler is the person who has knowledge (Mem. III 9 11 (Greek)). (Corinne Gartner)

Connect Socrates' ship of state metaphor (488b-e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s analogy of how “a badly built ship often sails better, although not because of itself, but because it has a good navigator” in relation to luck (EE VIII.2 1247a23-29 (Greek)). (Stella Chiari)

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Connect Socrates’ description of dialectic as involving a grasp of first principles (511b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s theory of nous as that with which we grasp first principles (e.g. Posterior Analytics I.32 88b35-89a2 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

Connect Socrates’ description of dialectic as involving a grasp of first principles (511b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s theory of nous as that with which we grasp starting-points, both first principles and the ultimate particulars of practical reasoning (NE VI.7= E V.7 1141b16-19 (Greek), NE VI.11= EE V.11 1143a35-b6 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

Connect Socrates’ description of dialectic as involving a grasp of first principles (511b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s psychology of nous (De Anima III.5 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates’ description of dialectical thinking by which we come to grasp starting-points (511b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s description of a “dialectical deduction” (Topics I.1 100a29-30 ff. (Greek)) (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates’ idea of a “first principle” (archê) (510b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s idea of a “true and primitive” principle (Topics I.1 100a25-100b20 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

AristotlePlato
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Connect Socrates’ description of a process of thought by which we grasp first principles (510b-f (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of induction and its use in helping us come to grasp first principles (Posterior Analytics II.19 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates’ description of a kind of thinking that starts from “assumptions” and proceeds “down to a conclusion” (510b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s theory of demonstrative reasoning (Posterior Analytics I.1-8 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates’ account of how mathematicians think and work (510c (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of mathematics and mathematical objects (Metaphysics XIII (Greek) and XIV (Greek)).

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Connect Socrates’ category of animals, plants, and artifacts on the divided line (510a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that perception is of particulars/individuals (De Anima II.5 417b21-23 (Greek); Posterior Analytics I.31 87b37–88a7 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

Connect Socrates’ category of animals, plants, and artifacts on the divided line (510a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s study of physics, which studies the features of the natural world that are always or for the most part (Physics II.8 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

AristotlePlato
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Connect Socrates’ description of the divided line, which divides cognitive capacities (imaging, belief, thought, and understanding) along with their proper objects (509d ff. (Greek) with Aristotle’s distinctions between perception, imagination, opinion, understanding, knowledge and thought (De Anima III.3 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates’ broad classification of the visible and the intelligible (509d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s distinction between knowledge and perception: “what actual sensation apprehends is individuals while what knowledge apprehends is universals” (De Anima II.5 417b21-23 (Greek); Posterior Analytics I.31 87b37–88a7 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates’ proposal that the good gives truth to objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower (508e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s account of the so-called “active intellect,” which is “a sort of positive state like light” and without which “nothing thinks” (De Anima III.5 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

AristotlePlato
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Connect Socrates’ identification of the sun as the “author and cause” of light, which makes eyes see and visible things seen (508a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s theory of four causes (Physics II.3 (Greek), Metaphysics V.2 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates’ view that visual perception is uniquely in need of a medium — light — by which visible objects can be seen (507d-e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s view that a medium is necessary for perception to take place (De Anima II.7 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates’ denial that sense-perception requires a medium to connect our sensory faculties with perceptible objects (507c-d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s view that a medium is necessary for perception to take place (De Anima II.7 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates’ picture of different sensory faculties corresponding to different perceptible objects (507c (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of three kinds of sense-objects (special sensibles, common sensibles, and incidental sensibles) and their role in the division of the senses (De Anima II.6 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates’ claim that “opinions divorced from knowledge are ugly things” and “blind” (506c (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that practical wisdom is the virtue of “that part which forms opinions; for opinion is about what can be otherwise, and so is practical wisdom” (NE VI.5 1140b25-30 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

Connect Socrates’ claim that “opinions divorced from knowledge are ugly things” and “blind” (506c (Greek)) with the Stoic view that opinions are something “weak” and like what is “false and not known” (Cicero, Academica 1.40-42 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

AristotlePlatoPyrrhonian Skeptics
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Connect Glaucon’s question about what Socrates thinks the good is (506b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of various common opinions about what happiness (eudaimonia) is (NE I.4 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

Connect Glaucon’s question about what Socrates thinks the good is (506b (Greek)) with Sextus Empiricus’s investigations into various views about the good and the bad (PH III.168-238 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates’ claim that the good is “that … which every soul pursues and for its sake does all that it does” (505e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that the chief good is what we desire everything else for the sake of, what we desire for its own sake, and what we do not choose for the sake of anything else (NE I.2 1094a17-22 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

Connect Socrates’ claim that the good is “that … which every soul pursues and for its sake does all that it does” (505e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that “knowing what virtue is” is less important than “knowing where virtue comes from” (EE I.5 1216b20-25 (Greek)). (Stella Chiari and Christiana Olfert) 

AristotlePlatoPyrrhonian Skeptics
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Connect Socrates’ claim that when it comes to the good, we are not satisfied with appearances but we all seek what’s really good (505d ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that “every art and every investigation, and likewise every practical pursuit or undertaking, seems to aim at some good: hence it has been well said that the good is that at which all things aim” (NE I.1 1094a1-2 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

Connect Socrates’ claim that when it comes to the good, we are not satisfied with appearances but we all seek what’s really good (505d ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s theory of wish (boulêsis) as desire for the good as opposed to the apparent good (NE III.4 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

Connect Socrates’ claim that when it comes to the good, we are not satisfied with appearances but we all seek what’s really good (505d ff. (Greek)) with Sextus Empiricus’s claim that the Pyrrhonian Skeptics follow appearances and assent to what their appearances tell them (PH I.13 (Greek), 22 (Greek)), but suspend judgment about “external objects,” “unclear objects,” “unclear objects of investigation in the sciences,” and how things “actually” are (PH I.13-14 (Greek), 19 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

Connect Socrates’ claim that when it comes to the good, we are not satisfied with appearances but we all seek what’s really good (505d ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that the object of desire is “either the real or the apparent good” (De Anima III.9 433a28-30 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

AristotlePlato
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Again, connect Socrates’ demand that the ensuing discussion attain “the greatest precision” (504d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s warnings that “precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions” and that “it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits: it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician demonstrative proofs” (NE II.3 1094b12-27 (Greek)) (Christiana Olfert)

AristotlePlato
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Connect Socrates’ remark that some people get “lazy” and stop their inquiries (504c (Greek)) with Sextus Empiricus’s claim that the Pyrrhonian Skeptics, in contrast to the Dogmatists and the Academics, are the only ones who are “still investigating” (PH I.1-4 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

AristotlePlato
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Connect Socrates’ proposal that someone must “partake of both temperaments” (i.e. quick-mindedness on the one hand, and steadfastness and stability on the other) to qualify as a ruler for the ideal city (503d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that virtue of character lies in a mean or intermediate between two extremes (NE II.6 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

AristotlePlato
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Again, connect Socrates’ discussion of how philosophers will be political rulers (502d ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that “philosophy is rightly called a knowledge of truth. The object of theoretic knowledge is truth, while that of practical knowledge is action” and “if it was to escape ignorance that men studied philosophy, it is obvious that they pursued science for the sake of knowledge, and not for any practical utility” (Metaphysics 982b20-21 (Greek), 993b19-21 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

AristotlePlato
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Connect Socrates’ claim that philosophers are “lovers of reality and truth” with (501d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that “philosophy is rightly called a knowledge of truth” (Metaphysics 993b19-21 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

AristotlePlato
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Connect Socrates’ description of how a philosopher ruler applies their knowledge of “justice, beauty, sobriety and the like” to concrete political arrangements and individual souls (501b ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s account of practical wisdom, which is concerned with the practical good that can be otherwise and brought about in action, and which “is not concerned with universals only - it must also recognize the particulars; for it is practical, and practice is concerned with particulars” (NE VI.7= EE V.7 1141b9-20 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

Connect Socrates’ description of how a philosopher ruler applies their knowledge of “justice, beauty, sobriety and the like” to concrete political arrangements and individual souls (501 ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s warnings that “precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions” and that “it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits: it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician demonstrative proofs” (NE I.3 1094b12-27 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

Connect Socrates’ description of how a philosopher ruler applies their knowledge of “justice, beauty, sobriety and the like” to concrete political arrangements and individual souls (501 ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that knowledge of the good will have “a great influence on life” because then we will, “like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what we should” (NE I.2 1094a22-25 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

Connect Socrates’ description of how a philosopher ruler applies their knowledge of “justice, beauty, sobriety and the like” to concrete political arrangements and individual souls (501 ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claims that “The object of theoretic knowledge is truth, while that of practical knowledge is action” and “if it was to escape ignorance that men studied philosophy, it is obvious that they pursued science for the sake of knowledge, and not for any practical utility” (Metaphysics 982b20-21 (Greek), 993b19-21 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

Connect Socrates’ description of how a philosopher ruler applies their knowledge of “justice, beauty, sobriety and the like” to concrete political arrangements and individual souls (501 ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that the end of productive sciences is not knowledge but action, for we wish not, or not merely, to know what courage or justice is, but to be courageous and just (EE I.5 1216b17-25 (Greek)). (Corinne Gartner) 

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Connect Socrates' description of philosophers who contemplate, and therefore try to imitate, eternal and unchanging things (500c (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that “it is in virtue of a certain likeness and kinship with their objects that [all parts of the soul] have the knowledge they have” (NE VI.1= EE V.1 1139a10-11 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates' claim that only philosophers (who are sometimes considered “useless”) should rule in the ideal city (499b ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s distinction between a rational capacity that grasps unchanging principles and a rational capacity that grasps variable principles (NE VI.1 = EE V.7 (Greek)), between theoretical and practical wisdom (NE VI.7 = EE V.7 (Greek)), and between the contemplative life and the practical and political life (NE X.8 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates' affirmation of the proverb “fine things are hard” (497d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that “both art and excellence are always concerned with what is harder; for even the good is better when it is harder” (NE II.3 1105a7-9 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates' contrast between “arts and crafts” and philosophy (495d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s distinction between art/skill/expertise (technê) and wisdom (sophia) (NE VI.4 = EE V.4 (Greek), VI.7 = EE V.7 (Greek), cf. VI.1 = EE V.1 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates' claim that education and upbringing can distort a philosophical nature and make it turn out badly (495a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s argument that none of the virtues of character are found in us by nature, because “no natural property can be altered by habituation” (NE II.1 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

Connect Socrates’ claim that education can distort a philosophical nature and make it turn out badly (495a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s statement that a “lack of educatedness” can lead individuals to be misled by arguments that are not philosophical (EE I.6 1216b35-1217a9 (Greek)). (Stella Chiari)

Connect Socrates' claim that education and upbringing can distort a philosophical nature and make it turn out badly (495a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that character is not innate (EE II.2 1220b1 (Greek)). (Corinne Gartner)

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Connect Socrates' description of the sophists’ knowledge of how to manage “a great strong beast” — knowledge which they call “wisdom — (493a ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric (Rhetoric (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

Connect Socrates' claim that the sophists’ knowledge of “the great strong beast” amounts to “calling the things that pleased it good and the things that vexed it bad” without distinguishing between what is really “honorable or base, good or evil, just or unjust” (493b ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that the virtuous person is the standard or the measure for everything (NE IX.4 1166a13 (Greek); X.5 1176a17 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates' claim that “evil is more opposed to the good than the not-good” (491d (Greek)) to Aristotle’s claim that each mean or intermediate relative to us is opposed to two extremes: excess and deficiency (NE II.6 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates' claim that certain “gifts of nature” can also “corrupt the soul” (491b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s concept of “natural virtue” (NE VI.13 = EE V.13 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

Connect Socrates' claim that certain “gifts of nature” can also “corrupt the soul” (491b (Greek)) to Aristotle’s discussion of how luck appears to allow individuals to “accomplish many things” even in the absence of wisdom (EE VIII.2 1247a3-12 (Greek)). (Stella Chiari)

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Connect Socrates' claim that “the leader of the choir for [the philosopher], if you recollect, was truth” (490a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that the function (ergon) of our rational capacities is “truth and falsity” (NE VI.2= EE V.2 1139a26-30 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates' description of the expertise of the “true pilot” (488e ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of technê as an intellectual excellence (NE VI.4 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Adeimantus’s description of philosophers who become “cranks” and “rascals” and are “rendered useless to society” (487d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s description of Thales, Anaxagoras and others who “have wisdom but not practical wisdom” because “we see them ignorant of what is to their own advantage,” although “they know things that are remarkable, admirable, difficult, and divine, but useless” (NE VI.7= EE V.7 1141b4-6 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates' reference to “the game of question and answer” (487b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of sophistical arguments, especially eristic discussions with a questioner and answerer, where the questioner requires a “yes” or “no” answer from the answerer (Sophistical Refutations 11 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates' comments about the role of good memory in a philosophic nature (486d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s comments about the role of memory in learning and gaining knowledge (Posterior Analytics II.19 (Greek), Met. I.1 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates’ claim that we cannot “properly” love an activity that is painful and has “little result” (486c (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that “an activity is intensified by its proper pleasure, since each class of things is better judged of and brought to precision by those who engage in the activity with pleasure” (NE X.5 1175a30-32 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

Connect Socrates’ claim that we cannot “properly” love an activity that is painful and has “little result” (486c (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of the “puzzle” of whether “the object of love is the pleasant or the good” (EE VII.2 1235b18-24 (Greek)). (Stella Chiari)

Connect Socrates’ claim that we cannot “properly” love an activity that is painful and has “little result” (486c (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of whether pleasure is a necessary condition for friendship (EE VII.2 1237a18-31 (Greek)). (Stella Chiari)

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Connect Socrates' argument that a philosopher will also be temperate, liberal, courageous, and just (485d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s argument that “it is not possible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without virtue of character” (NE VI.13= EE V.13 1144b30-32 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates' description of the philosopher as a lover of truth (485c ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that “the good man differs from others most by seeing the truth in each class of things” (NE III.4 1113a32 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates' requirement that a philosopher grasps ideals with “the exactest possible contemplation” (484c-d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that “it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits” (NE 1.3 1094b24-25 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

Connect Socrates' requirement that a philosopher grasps ideals with “the exactest possible contemplation” (484c-d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that theoretical wisdom is the most exact of the sciences (epistêmai) (NE VI.7=EE V.7 1141a16-17 (Greek)). (Corinne Gartner)

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Connect Socrates' description of those who “wander amid the multiplicities of multifarious things” (484d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s description of a capacity of the soul “by which we contemplate variable things” (NE VI.1 1139a5-9 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Socrates' identification of philosophers as those “capable of apprehending that which is eternal and unchanging” (484b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s description of a capacity of the soul “by which we contemplate things whose principles cannot be otherwise” (NE VI.1= EE V.1 1139a5-7 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

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Connect Plato’s argument against defining the good as pleasure on the grounds that there are bad pleasures (505c (Greek)) with Epicurus’ view that pleasure is the primary good despite there being less desirable pleasures (Letter to Menoeceus DL X.129-130 (Greek)). (Amy Li and Chuyan Wang)

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Connect Plato’s view of the form of the good being the cause of things being known and also of their being (508e-509e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s argument for the prime mover being the cause of everything (Metaphysics XII.6-7 1072a25-1072b4 (Greek)). (Amy Li and Chuyan Wang)

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Connect Socrates' claim that certain “gifts of nature” can also “corrupt the soul” (491b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s concept of “natural virtue” (NE VI.13 = EE V.13 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)

Connect Socrates' claim that certain “gifts of nature” can also “corrupt the soul” (491b (Greek)) to Aristotle’s discussion of how luck appears to allow individuals to “accomplish many things” even in the absence of wisdom (EE VIII.2 1247a3-12 (Greek)). (Stella Chiari)

Connect Plato’s description of how the philosophic soul can be corrupted (490e-491e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s argument about the relationship between practical wisdom and virtue of character (NE VI.12-13 (Greek)). (Cass Novello, Malahim, and Stella Chiari)

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Connect Plato’s view of the ideal philosopher-king (485a-487d (Greek)) to Aristotle’s criticisms of the Republic (Politics II.1-5 (Greek)). (Cass Novello, Malahim, and Stella Chiari)