Connect Socrates’ argument that the rational part of the soul can control the spirited part (441b-c (Greek)) with Seneca’s claim that, once impulsive passions like anger take control of the mind, the only thing that can restrain or check them are equally powerful passions (De Ira, I.10 (Latin)). (Lauren Kim)
Connect Socrates’ argument that the rational and appetitive parts coexist in the soul, each striving for control (439b-d (Greek)), with Seneca’s claim that passion and reason do not occupy distinct and separate provinces in the mind but are instead different states of the same mind (De Ira, I.8 (Latin)). (Lauren Kim)
Connect Plato's view of justice as the harmony between different parts of the soul performing their appropriate function (443d-444a (Greek)) with the Stoic description of virtue as a state of harmony between the rational soul and the natural order. (DL VII.87-89 (Greek); Cicero, On Ends, 3.33-34 (Latin)) (Hana Kebede Tess Johnson Marsha Germain Eugene Kitahara)
Connect Plato’s definition of individual justice as each part of the soul doing its own work (443d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that justice might be said “metaphorically and in virtue of a certain resemblance” to be a relation between parts of the soul (NE V.11 1138b5-10 (Greek)). (Connor Johnston, Claire Ferris, Grace Drugge)
Connect Plato’s account of justice (443c-e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s depiction of a flourishing life (NE 1.7 1095a-1098b (Greek)). (Patricia Marechal and the UCSD Team)
Connect Plato’s argument that reason should “rule” the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul (439d-441c (Greek)) with Epictetus’ argument that control over emotions and desires equates to virtue (Discourses II.18 (Greek)). (Patricia Marechal and the UCSD Team)
Connect Socrates’ argument that the rational part of the soul should rule over the appetitive part (441e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s argument that intellect should rule over appetite (Politics I.5 1254b4-10 (Greek)). (Lauren Kim)
Book IV: Connect Socrates’ argument that the rational part of the soul should rule over the appetitive part (441e (Greek)) with Seneca’s claim that right reason is the “lawful ruler (...) who holds the reins” in people’s minds only when it keeps its distance from passion, which could otherwise seize control of the mind from reason (De Ira, I.7 (Latin)). (Lauren Kim)
Connect Plato’s distinction between appetitive and rational parts of the soul (436b-439e (Greek)), with Aristotle’s division of the soul (NE I.13 1102a26-1103a10 (Greek)). (Connor Johnston, Claire Ferris, Grace Drugge)
Connect Socrates’ claims about human pleasure (426a-b (Greek)) with Thomas Aquinas’ discussion of whether every pleasure is good (Summa Question 34: Of the Goodness and Malice of Pleasures: Second Article (Latin)). (Patricia Marechal and the UCSD Team)
Connect Plato’s view on education (425b-427a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s stance on practice for the development and cultivation of virtue (NE II.1 1103a-1104b (Greek)). (Patricia Marechal and the UCSD Team)
Connect Plato’s argument that “a sound nurture and education if kept up creates good natures” (424a-d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that intellectual virtue comes from teaching, but virtue of character comes from habituation (NE II.1 1103a14-25 (Greek)). (Connor Johnston, Claire Ferris, Grace Drugge)
Connect Socrates’ claim that just actions produce justice in the soul in the way that healthy things produce health (444c-d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of how every disposition, in body and in soul, is produced by the same things, such that the best disposition, virtue, is brought about by the best things (EE II.1 1220a23-34 (Greek)). (Corinne Gartner)
Connect Socrates’ claim that “that as and whereby the state was wise so and thereby is the individual wise” (441d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that “good citizen need not of necessity possess the excellence which makes a good man” (Politics III.4 1276b34-35 (Greek), IV.8 1293b6-8 (Greek)). (Lauren Kim)
Connect Socrates’ claim that children have spirit right from birth (441a (Greek)) while rational calculation comes later with Aristotle’s claim that desire and anger are present in children right from birth, but reason is developed as they grow older (Politics VII.15 1334b20-25 (Greek)). (Corinne Gartner)
Connect Socrates’ claim that children develop rational calculation later on in life, if ever (441a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that we do not apply the term “action” to children until they develop “rational calculation” (EE II.8 1224a20-29 (Greek)). (Stella Chiari)
Connect Socrates’ discussion of spirited anger, which is part of human nature (439a (Greek)), with Seneca’s claim that, “Anger, as we have said, is eager to punish; and that such a desire should exist in man’s peaceful breast is least of all according to his nature; for human life is founded on benefits and harmony and is bound together into an alliance for the common help of all, not by terror, but by love towards one another” (De Ira, I.5 (Latin)). (Lauren Kim)
Connect Socrates’ discussion of spirit and spirited anger (439a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of the virtue of mild-manneredness as a mean between the extremes of harshness and slavishness (EE III.3 (Greek)). (Corinne Gartner)
Connect Socrates’ claim that reason is one third of the soul, along with spirit and appetite (439d-e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that reason itself is made of two parts: the prescriptive part and the obedient part, and his further claim that "it makes no difference whether the soul is divisible or indivisible, so long as it has different faculties” (EE II.1 1219b26-37 (Greek)). (Stella Chiari)
Connect Socrates’ tripartite soul argument (439e-441b (Greek)) with Aristotle's description of the constitution of the soul including one part that naturally rules (the rational part) and a part of the soul that is naturally ruled (the irrational part) (Politics I.13 1260a4-7 (Greek)). (Lauren Kim)
Connect Socrates’ tripartite soul argument (439e-441b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s explanation of the “three lives” that people commonly connect happiness with: “political, philosophical, and the life devoted to indulgence” (EE I.5 1216a28-30 (Greek)). (Stella Chiari)
Connect Socrates’ tripartite soul argument (439e-441b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s introduction of the three parts of the soul; the nutritive part, the perceptual part, and the desiring part (EE II 1219b18-25 (Greek)). (Stella Chiari)
Connect Socrates’ qualification that they have been discussing civic courage (430c (Greek) with Aristotle’s account of civic courage as courage due to a sense of shame (EE III.1 1229a13-14 (Greek)). (Corinne Gartner)
Connect Socrates' discussion of the relationship between moderation (sophrosunê) and self-control (430e-431b (Greek)) with Xenophon’s discussion of the relationship between moderation (sophrosunê) and self-control (and lack of control/akrasia) (Mem. IV 5 7-9 (Greek)). (Corinne Gartner)
Connect Socrates’ discussion of the relationship between moderation and self-control (sophrosunê) (430e-431b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s comparison of temperate and intemperate individuals (EE III.2 1230a36-1230b20 (Greek)). (Stella Chiari)
Connect Socrates’ discussion of the relationship between moderation and self-control (sophrosunê) (430e-431b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s connection between being a just person and exerting self-control (EE II.7 1223b10-17 (Greek)). (Stella Chiari)
Connect Socrates’ view that wisdom is only possessed by the ruling class (429a (Greek)) with Aristotle's claim that “excellence of a ruler differs from that of a citizen” (Politics III.4 1277a13-15 (Greek), 1277a23 (Greek)). (Lauren Kim)
Connect Plato’s notion of civic wisdom as good counsel for the city as a whole (428b-e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s notion of political wisdom (NE VI.8 1141b23-28 (Greek)). (Connor Johnston, Claire Ferris, Grace Drugge)
Connect Socrates’ claims about honoring one’s elders (425a-b (Greek)) with Xenophon on the duty of honoring one’s parents (Mem. IV 4 20 (Greek)). (Corinne Gartner)
Connect Socrates’ discussion of what will not be legally decreed/legislated in the ideal city (kallipolis) (425a-c (Greek)) with Xenophon’s claims about unwritten laws (Mem. IV 4 19 (Greek)). (Corinne Gartner)
Connect Socrates’ claim that a city with poor and rich citizens is really two cities at war with one another (423a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that a city with masters and slaves is a city that is “at enmity with one another” (Politics IV.11 1295b21-26 (Greek)). (Lauren Kim)
Connect Socrates’ claim that both poverty and wealth make people worse citizens (421d-e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s take on owning property and living temperately (Politics II.6 1265a29-36 (Greek)). (Lauren Kim)
Connect Socrates’ claim that guardians will be happy in the ideal city (kallipolis) (420e-421c (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that guardians are deprived of happiness in kallipolis (Politics II.5 1264b15-23 (Greek)). (Lauren Kim)
Connect Socrates’ restriction on the private wealth of the guardians (420a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of the view that happiness is wealth (NE I.5 1096a6-10 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ restriction on the private wealth of the guardians (420a (Greek)) with the Stoic view that wealth is indifferent (Stobaeus, Anthology 2.5a (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ analogy between virtue and vice in the soul and health and disease in the body (444c ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s analogy between virtue and vice of character in the soul and health/strength and disease/weakness in the body (NE II.2 1104a10-1104b4 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ analogy of injustice to disease in the body (444d-e (Greek)) with Epicurus’s claim that “injustice is not a bad thing in its own right, but [only] because of the fear produced by the suspicion that one will not escape the notice of those assigned to punish such actions” (Principal Doctrines DL X.34 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ picture of injustice as “a kind of civil war” between the three parts of the soul or city (444b (Greek)) with Epicurus’s claim that “there was no justice or injustice with respect to all those animals which were unable to make pacts about neither harming one another nor being harmed. Similarly, [there was no justice or injustice] for all those nations which were unable or unwilling to make pacts about neither harming one another nor being harmed” (Principal Doctrines, DL X.150 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ picture of injustice as “a kind of civil war” between the three parts of the soul or city (444b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s picture of injustice as “grasping” for an excess of goods related to “prosperity and adversity” (NE V.1 = EE IV.1 1129a31-1129b (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ picture of injustice as “a kind of civil war” between the three parts of the soul or city (444b (Greek)) with the Stoics’ view that injustice is ignorance of the distribution of proper value to each person (Stobaeus, Anthology 2.5b1 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ claim that justice is not a matter of “doing of one's own business externally, but with regard to that which is within and in the true sense concerns one's self” (443d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s definition of justice in the general or “wide” sense as “complete virtue … not absolutely, but in relation to our neighbor” (NE V.1 = EE IV.1 1129b25-26 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ claim that justice is not a matter of “doing of one's own business externally, but with regard to that which is within and in the true sense concerns one's self” (443d (Greek)) with Epicurus’s definition of justice as “a pact about neither harming one another nor being harmed” (Principal Doctrines, DL X.151 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ “tests” of their definition of justice in terms of the characteristic actions/behavior of a just person (442e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that justice is “a state of character which makes people disposed to do what is just and makes them act justly and wish for what is just” (NE V.1= EE IV.1 1129a7-9 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ “commonplace” tests of their definition of justice (442e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s so-called “endoxic method,” the process of arguing from “observed facts” and “common opinions” (e.g. NE VII.1= EE VI.1 1145b1-7 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ “commonplace” tests of their definition of justice (442e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of whose beliefs should be considered in giving an account (EE I.2 1214b28-1215a8 (Greek)). (Corinne Gartner)
Connect Socrates' definition of individual justice as each part of the soul performing their own task (441d-e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s classification of justice as mean or intermediate between extremes, and therefore virtue of character rather than an intellectual virtue (NE V.1= EE IV.1 1129a1-6 (Greek)) (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates' definition of individual justice as each part of the soul performing their own task (441d-e (Greek)) with the Stoic definition of justice as “knowledge of the distribution of proper value to each person.” (Stobaeus, Anthology 2.5b1 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates' definition of individual justice as each part of the soul performing their own task (441d-e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s definition of justice in the general or “wide” sense as “complete virtue … not absolutely, but in relation to our neighbor” (NE V.1= EE IV.1 1129b25-26 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates' definition of individual justice as each part of the soul performing their own task (441d-e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s distinction between distributive and rectificatory justice (NE V.2= EE IV.2 1130b30-32 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates' definition of individual justice as each part of the soul performing their own task (441d-e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s definition of distributive justice as the proportional distribution, according to merit, of “honor or money or the other things that fall to be divided among those who have a share in the constitution” (NE V.2-3= EE IV.2-3 1130b30-1131b24 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates' definition of individual justice as each part of the soul performing their own task (441d-e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s definition of rectificatory or corrective justice as removing an unjust inequality, or restoring equality, between partners in a voluntary or involuntary transaction (NE V.4 = EE IV.4 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates' definition of individual justice as each part of the soul performing their own task (441d-e (Greek)) with Epicurus’s definition of justice as “a pact about neither harming one another nor being harmed” (Principal Doctrines, DL X.151 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ definition of individual soberness/temperance/ moderation (sophrosunê) as “friendship and concord of these same parts, when … the ruling principle and its two subjects are at one in the belief that the reason ought to rule and do not raise faction against it” (442c-d (Greek)) with the Stoic view that temperance/ soberness/moderation is “is knowledge of what is to be chosen and avoided and what is neither” (Stobaeus, Anthology 2.5b1 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ definition of individual soberness/temperance/ moderation (sophrosunê) as “friendship and concord of these same parts, when … the ruling principle and its two subjects are at one in the belief that the reason ought to rule and do not raise faction against it” (442c-d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s definition of moderation as a mean with regard to bodily pleasures of touch and taste (NE III.10 1117b24-1118a26 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ definition of individual courage as preserving “in the midst of pains and pleasures the rule handed down by the reason as to what is or is not to be feared” (442c (Greek)) with the Stoic definition of courage as “knowledge of what is terrible and what is not terrible and what is neither” (Stobaeus, Anthology 2.5b1 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ definition of individual courage as preserving “in the midst of pains and pleasures the rule handed down by the reason as to what is or is not to be feared” (442c (Greek)) with Aristotle’s definition of courage as “a mean with respect to things that inspire confidence or fear, in the circumstances that have been stated [i.e. the prospect of a noble death], and it chooses or endures things because it is noble to do so, or because it is base not to do so” (NE III.7 1116a10-12 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ definition of individual wisdom (sophia) as “ the knowledge (epistêmê) of what is beneficial for each and for the whole, the community composed of the three” (442c (Greek)) with Aristotle’s definition of theoretical wisdom (sophia) as “intuitive reason combined (nous) with … scientific knowledge (epistêmê) of the highest objects” (NE VI.6 1141a17-18 (Greek) = EE V.6). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ definition of individual wisdom (sophia) as “ the knowledge (epistêmê) of what is beneficial for each and for the whole, the community composed of the three” (442c (Greek)) with Aristotle’s definition of practical wisdom (phronêsis) as “a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods” (NE VI.5 1140b20-21 (Greek) = EE V.6). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ definition of individual wisdom (sophia) as “ the knowledge (epistêmê) of what is beneficial for each and for the whole, the community composed of the three” (442c (Greek)) with the Stoic definition of practical wisdom or prudence (phronêsis) as “knowledge of which things are good and bad and neither” (DL VII.92 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ definition of individual wisdom (sophia) as “ the knowledge (epistêmê) of what is beneficial for each and for the whole, the community composed of the three” (442c (Greek)) with Epicurus’s claim that practical wisdom or prudence (phronêsis) is “a more valuable thing than philosophy [philosophia]” and it “is the source of all the other virtues, teaching that it is impossible to live pleasantly without living prudently, honourably, and justly, and impossible to live prudently, honourably, and justly without living pleasantly” (Letter to Menoeceus, DL X.132 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ claim that spirit is a third part of the soul, alongside appetite and reason (441a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of the tripartite model of the soul (De Anima III.9 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ claim that spirit is a third part of the soul, alongside appetite and reason (441a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that it is “absurd” to break up the “desiderative” part of the soul into parts (De Anima 432b3-7 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ account of Leontius’s motivational conflict (439e-440a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of lack of self-control or incontinence (akrasia) with respect to anger (NE VII.6 (Greek)= EE VI.6). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ account of Leontius’s motivational conflict (439e-440a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of shame (NE IV.9 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ account of Leontius’s motivational conflict (439e-440a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of shame (EE III.7 1233b26-29 (Greek)). (Corinne Gartner)
Connect Socrates’ discussion of spirit (thumos) (439e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of spirit (NE III.8 1116b23-1117a9 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ argument that there are distinct parts of the soul (439b ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s questions about, and criticisms of, dividing the soul (into “parts” or otherwise) (NE I.13 1102a26-32 (Greek), De Anima III.9 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ argument that there are distinct parts of the soul (439b ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s approach to dividing the soul into parts that are relevant for human virtue (EE II.1 1219b27-1220a3 (Greek)). (Corinne Gartner)
Connect Socrates’ proposal that different kinds of knowledge are distinguished by their different objects (438c (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that “where objects differ in kind the part of the soul answering to each of the two is different in kind, since it is in virtue of a certain likeness and kinship with their objects that they have the knowledge they have (NE VI.1 1139a8-11 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ list of psychological “opposites” (437b-c (Greek)) with Aristotle’s description of contrary impulses in the soul (NE I.13 1102b12-28 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ list of psychological “opposites” (437b-c (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of how desires can “run counter to one another” (De Anima III.10 433b5-13 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates' so-called “Principle of Opposites” (436b-c (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of contraries (Met. V.9 1018a25-39 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ inference from identity of names to identity in “form” (435a-b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of “equivocal” names (Categories 1 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ inference from identity of names to identity in “form” (435a-b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s rejection of this inference in the case of “good” (NE I.6 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ comparison between justice in a city and justice in an individual (434c-d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s conception of justice as a virtue of character in our soul (NE V = EE IV (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ comparison between justice in a city and justice in an individual (434c-d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s conception of justice as a virtue of character involving “lawfulness” (NE V.1-2 = EE IV.1-2 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ comparison between justice in a city and justice in an individual (434c-d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of “legal” justice (NE V.7 = EE IV. 7 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ definition of civic wisdom (sophia) as science (epistêmê) of what is good for the city as a whole and for its relation to other states (428c-d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s definition of theoretical wisdom (sophia) as “intuitive reason (nous) combined with … scientific knowledge (epistêmê) of the highest objects” (NE VI.7 1141a17-18 (Greek)= EE V.7). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ definition of civic wisdom (sophia) as science (epistêmê) of what is good for the city as a whole and for its relation to other states (428c-d (Greek)) with Aristotle’s definition of practical wisdom (phronêsis) as “a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods” (NE VI.5 1140b20-21 (Greek)= EE V.5). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ definition of civic wisdom (sophia) as science (epistêmê) of what is good for the city as a whole and for its relation to other states (428c-d (Greek)) with the Stoic definition of practical wisdom or prudence (phronêsis) as “knowledge of which things are good and bad and neither” (DL VII.92 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ definition of civic wisdom (sophia) as science (epistêmê) of what is good for the city as a whole and for its relation to other states (428c-d (Greek)) with Epicurus’s claim that practical wisdom or prudence (phronêsis) is “a more valuable thing than philosophy [philosophia]” and it “is the source of all the other virtues, teaching that it is impossible to live pleasantly without living prudently, honourably, and justly, and impossible to live prudently, honourably, and justly without living pleasantly” (Letter to Menoeceus, DL X.132 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ definition of courage as “the unfailing conservation of right and lawful belief about things to be and not to be feared” (430b (Greek)) with the Stoic definition of courage as “knowledge of what is terrible and what is not terrible and what is neither” (Stobaeus, Anthology 2.5b1 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ definition of courage as “the unfailing conservation of right and lawful belief about things to be and not to be feared” (430b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s definition of courage as “a mean with respect to things that inspire confidence or fear, in the circumstances that have been stated [i.e. the prospect of a noble death], and it chooses or endures things because it is noble to do so, or because it is base not to do so” (NE III.7 1116a10-12 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ definition of courage as “the unfailing conservation of right and lawful belief about things to be and not to be feared” (430b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s account of courage as the best state concerned with feelings of fear and confidence in relation to what is frightening without qualification (EE III.1 1228a37-b38 (Greek)). (Corinne Gartner)
Connect Socrates’ definition of courage as “the unfailing conservation of right and lawful belief about things to be and not to be feared” (430b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s account of courage and states that resembles courage (EE III.1 (Greek)). (Corinne Gartner)
Connect Socrates’ definition of civic soberness/temperance/moderation as “the concord of the naturally superior and inferior as to which ought to rule both in the state and the individual” (432a-b (Greek)) with with the Stoic view that temperance/soberness/moderation is “is knowledge of what is to be chosen and avoided and what is neither” (Stobaeus, Anthology 2.5b1 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ definition of civic soberness/temperance/moderation as “the concord of the naturally superior and inferior as to which ought to rule both in the state and the individual” (432a-b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s definition of moderation as a mean with regard to bodily pleasures of touch and taste (NE III.9-10 1117b24-1118a26 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ definition of civic soberness/temperance/moderation as “the concord of the naturally superior and inferior as to which ought to rule both in the state and the individual” (432a-b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s definition of moderation as a mean with regard to bodily pleasures of touch and taste, which reduce to those of the object of touch (EE III.2 1230b25 (Greek)). (Corinne Gartner)
Connect Socrates’ definition of civic justice as “the having and doing of one’s own and what belongs to oneself” (433e-424a (Greek)) with the Stoic definition of justice as “knowledge of the distribution of proper value to each person.” (Stobaeus, Anthology 2.5b1 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ definition of civic justice as “the having and doing of one’s own and what belongs to oneself” (433e-424a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that justice is homonymous; it is said in more than one way (NE V.1 = EE IV.1 1129a26-8 (Greek))
Connect Socrates’ definition of civic justice as “the having and doing of one’s own and what belongs to oneself” (433e-424a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s definition of justice in the general or “wide” sense as “complete virtue … not absolutely, but in relation to our neighbor” (NE V.1= EE IV.1 1129b25-26 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ definition of civic justice as “the having and doing of one’s own and what belongs to oneself” (433e-424a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s distinction between distributive and rectificatory justice (NE V.2= EE IV 2 1130b30-32 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ definition of civic justice as “the having and doing of one’s own and what belongs to oneself” (433e-424a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s definition of distributive justice as the proportional distribution, according to merit, of “honor or money or the other things that fall to be divided among those who have a share in the constitution” (NE V.2-3= EE IV.2-3 1130b30-1131b24 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ definition of civic justice as “the having and doing of one’s own and what belongs to oneself” (433e-424a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s definition of rectificatory or corrective justice as removing an unjust inequality, or restoring equality, between partners in a voluntary or involuntary transaction (NE V.4 = EE IV.4 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ definition of civic justice as “the having and doing of one’s own and what belongs to oneself” (433e-424a (Greek)) with Epicurus’s definition of justice as “a pact about neither harming one another nor being harmed” (Principal Doctrines, DL X.151 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ definition of civic justice as “the having and doing of one’s own and what belongs to oneself” (433e-434a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s assessment that something’s virtue is directly related to its having a function (ergon) (EE II.1 1218b37-1219a6 (Greek)). (Stella Chiari)
Connect Socrates’ use of a common saying about justice (433a ff (Greek)) with Aristotle’s so-called “endoxic method,” the process of arguing from “observed facts” and “common opinions” (e.g. NE VII.1= EE VI.1 1145b1-7 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ use of a common saying about justice (433a ff (Greek)) with Aristotle’s use of the so-called “endoxic method,” the process of arguing from “observed facts” and “common opinions,” in relation to reporting common beliefs about friendship (EE VII.1 (Greek)). (Corinne Gartner)
Connect Socrates’ use of a common phrase or opinion about soberness/ temperance/moderation in his inquiry into its definition (430e ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s so-called “endoxic method,” the process of arguing from “observed facts” and “common opinions” (e.g. NE VII.1 1145b1-7 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ likening of soberness/temperance/moderation to a kind of harmony between parts of the soul (431e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that “the appetitive element in a temperate man should harmonize with the rational principle” (NE III.12 1119b15-17 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ likening of soberness/temperance/moderation to a kind of harmony between parts of the soul (431e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s likening of virtue in general to a kind of unison between parts of the soul (NE I.13 1102b27-29 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ discussion of soberness/temperance/moderation (sophrosunê) as a form of self-mastery (431d ff (Greek).) with Aristotle’s distinction between virtue and continence/self-control (NE VII.1 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ discussion of soberness/temperance/moderation (sophrosunê) as a form of self-mastery (431d ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that in the continent/self-controlled person, the non-rational part of the soul “obeys” the rational part, while “in the temperate and brave man it is still more obedient; for in him it speaks, on all matters, with the same voice as the rational principle” (NE I.13 1102b24-29 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ discussion of soberness/temperance/moderation (sophrosunê) as a form of self-mastery (431d ff. (Greek)) with the Stoic view that self-control (enkrateia) is a “form” of virtue and is “is an unsurpassable disposition [concerned with] what accords with right reason” (DL VII.92 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ proposal that soberness/temperance/moderation (sophrosunê) is concerned with certain pleasures and appetites (430e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that all states of character, virtues and vices, are concerned with pleasure and pain (NE II.3 (Greek)).
Connect Socrates’ proposal that soberness/temperance/moderation (sophrosunê) is concerned with certain pleasures and appetites (430e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that soberness/ temperance/ moderation (sophrosunê) is more concerned with pleasure than pain; specifically with bodily pleasures as opposed to pleasures of the soul; and more specifically, with sensory pleasures of touch and taste (NE III.10 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ proposal that soberness/temperance/moderation (sophrosunê) is concerned with certain pleasures and appetites (430e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s proposal that because temperate people have pleasures, they also have appetites, including “those of taste and of touch”, and these appetites do not make an individual intemperate (EE III.2 1230b20-35 (Greek)). (Stella Chiari)
Connect Socrates’ discussion of soberness/moderation/temperance (sophrosunê) (430d ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of soberness/moderation/temperance (sophrosunê) (NE III.10-12 (Greek)). (Patricia Marechal and the UCSD team)
Connect Socrates’ discussion of soberness/moderation/temperance (sophrosunê) (430d ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of soberness/ moderation/temperance (sophrosunê) (EE III.2 (Greek)). (Corinne Gartner)
Connect Socrates’ analogy between the “fastness” of bravery and dye that is color-fast in wool (429e ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that virtue of character is a “firm and unchangeable character” (NE II.4 1105a31-34 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ suggestion that bravery in the city involves preserving a conviction (pistis) about what is to be feared (429b ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s classification of bravery as a virtue of character, i.e., a virtue belonging to the non-rational but reason-responsive part of the soul (NE I.13 1103a4-10 (Greek), II.7 1107a32-1107b3 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ focus on defense and war in discussing the virtue of bravery (429b ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that the brave man is specifically concerned with the “greatest” of frightful things in the “noblest” circumstances, namely, death in battle (NE III.6 1115a25-31 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ discussion of bravery (429a ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of bravery or courage (NE III.6-9 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ discussion of bravery (429a ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of courage and its relation to death, fear, spirit, and endurance (EE III.1 (Greek)). (Stella Chiari)
Connect Socrates' discussion of bravery (429a ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of courage as the virtue that is the mean between cowardice and rashness (EE III.1 1228a27-1228b2 (Greek)). (Stella Chiari)
Connect Socrates’ discussion of bravery as a means of self-preservation (429a-430c (Greek)) with Aristotle’s clarification that it is not courageous to die for the sake some pleasure, or merely to avoid pain, or if one simply feels ready for death (EE III.1 1229b39-1230a34 (Greek)). (Stella Chiari)
Connect Socrates’ remark that there is one sort of excellence and many sorts of badness (445c (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that “it is possible to fail in many ways … while to succeed is possible in only one way, for which reason also one is easy and the other difficult” (NE II.6 1106b28-31 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates' connection between wisdom and leadership/ruling (428e-429a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s description of mind (nous) as the “most authoritative element” in us (NE IX.8 1168b28-1169a11 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates' description of carpentry (and other kinds of expertise) as kinds of knowledge (epistêmê) (428b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s distinction between skill or expertise (technê) and knowledge (epistêmê) (e.g. NE VI.2-3 (Greek), 6 (Greek)= EE VI.2-3, 6; Met. I.1 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates' discussion of wisdom in the city as a kind of knowledge (epistêmê) (428b ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s description of political wisdom (NE VI.8 (Greek)= EE V.8). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates' discussion of wisdom in the city as a kind of knowledge (epistêmê) (428b ff. (Greek)) with Xenophon’s claim that wisdom is a kind of knowledge (epistêmê) (Mem. IV 6 7 (Greek)). (Corinne Gartner)
Connect Socrates' discussion of wisdom in the city as a kind of knowledge (epistêmê) (428b ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s description of epistêmê (e.g. NE VI.7 (Greek)=EE V.7, Posterior Analytics I.1 71b10–15 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates' discussion of wisdom in the city as a kind of knowledge (epistêmê) and “good counsel” (euboulia) (428b ff. (Greek)) with Aristotle’s inquiry into whether practical wisdom (phronêsis) and excellence in deliberation (euboulia) are a kind of knowledge (epistêmê) (NE VI.9 (Greek)= EE V.9). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates' inference from the city’s being “good in the full sense of the word” to its having certain virtues (427e (Greek)) with Aristotle’s assumption that something with a function (ergon) is a good example of its kind when it has “virtue added to the function” (NE I.7 1098a9-11 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates' inference from the city’s being “good in the full sense of the word” to its having certain virtues (427e (Greek)) with the Stoics’ list of “primary” and “subordinate” virtues (DL VII.92 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates' reluctance to discuss details of religion in the ideal city (427b-c (Greek)) with Epicurus’s claims that the gods are “not such as the many believe them to be” and that “the man who denies the gods of the many is not impious, but rather he who ascribes to the gods the opinions of the many” (Letter to Menoeceus, DL X.123 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ claim about the proper training for citizens from childhood (424e-425a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that “it makes no small difference … whether we form habits of one kind or another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather, all the difference” (NE II.1 1103b22-25 (Greek)) (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ concern for maintaining the unity of the city (423b-c (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of a community as a whole that is prior to its parts (Politics I.2 1253a19-39 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ comments relating something’s happiness to its nature (421c (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that, even in the case of a political community, “the nature of a thing is its end” (Politics I.2 1253b29-1253a3 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ comments about the relationship between one’s nature and one’s happiness (421c (Greek)) with Aristotle’s discussion of whether happiness originates from nature, habituation, inspiration or luck. (EE I.1 1214a15-29 (Greek)) (Stella Chiari)
Connect Socrates’ claim that they are aiming to make the ideal city happy “as a whole” (420b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that “every community is established with a view to some good” (Politics I.1 1252a1-2 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Socrates’ claim that they are aiming to make the ideal city happy “as a whole” (420b (Greek)) with Aristotle’s claim that “the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing for the sake of the good life” (Politics I.2 1252b29-30 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Adeimantus’s concerns about the happiness (eudaimonia) of the guardians (419a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s view about the connection between virtue and happiness (NE I.7 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Adeimantus’s concerns about the happiness (eudaimonia) of the guardians (419a (Greek)) with Aristotle’s view that happiness is our highest end or goal (NE I.4 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Adeimantus’s concerns about the happiness (eudaimonia) of the guardians (419a (Greek)) with Epicurus’s view that happiness is our highest good (Letter to Menoeceus, DL X.122 (Greek)). (Christiana Olfert)
Connect Adeimantus’s concerns about the happiness (eudaimonia) of the guardians (419a (Greek)) with the Stoic view that happiness is our highest end or goal (e.g. Seneca, Letters on Ethics, 124.6-7 (Latin)) (Christiana Olfert)